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We review the findings in surveys and experiments from the literature on attitudes to income 
inequality. We interpret the latter as any disparity in incomes between individuals. We 
classify these contributions into two broad groups of individual attitudes to income 
distribution in a society: the normative and the comparative view. The first can be thought of 
as the individual's disinterested evaluation of income inequality; on the contrary, the second 
view reflects self-interest, as individual’s inequality attitudes depend not only on how much 
income they receive but also on how much they receive compared to others. We conclude 
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1. Introduction 
A number of areas of research in Economics might sometimes be thought not to pass the 
‘So What?’ test: Do we really care about this issue? This would not seem to be the case for 
inequality, which looks like it passes the test with flying colours. Income inequality might be 
thought to occupy something like the same kind of place in the Economic Pantheon as 
unemployment: it is almost taken as an axiom that it is a bad thing.  
Given this sense of unanimity, it might seem to be churlish in the extreme to want to 
write a chapter about individuals' attitudes to inequality: surely they are negative aren't they? 
We believe that the situation is not quite as simple as might be imagined. First, we have to ask 
the rather fundamental question of what we mean when we talk about income inequality, and 
then why would we expect any measure of such inequality to be correlated with individual 
well-being. Following on from this setting-out of the scene, there are a number of open 
questions. Is inequality equally bad for everyone? And on an extremely practical level, how 
can we tell? Last, the term inequality is used perhaps rather loosely in the empirical literature. 
It is of interest to ask which measures of the distribution of income are the most important (to 
individuals) in this context: is it (as is commonly assumed) the Gini coefficient, or rather 
something else? As we will discuss below, recent work using experimental and survey 
methods has allowed considerable progress to be made in answering some of these questions.  
To set the stage, we first ask under which circumstances others' incomes should affect 
my own well-being.2 We use the term income inequality to refer to any disparities in incomes 
between individuals (i.e. there is income inequality when some individuals have different 
incomes than others). As opposed to many of the other variables that have been related to 
individual well-being, the distribution of income does not exist at the individual level: income 
inequality is rather measured only at an aggregate, often societal, level. The key axiom in the 
measurement of inequality is the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, according to which 
inequality increases whenever a transfer of income from a poorer to a richer individual takes 
place.  
We believe that people do indeed have preferences over inequality. It is helpful to 
consider two broad types of individual attitudes to the distribution of income in a society. The 
first can be thought of as the individual's disinterested evaluation of income inequality: if I see 
                                                 
2 We limit ourselves here to discussion of individuals’ evaluations of the inequality of income. Inequality in the 
distribution of other variables is of course of interest as well, including that of subjective well-being (as in Clark 
et al., 2014). 
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two distributions of income in some society, which do I believe is better? We will below call 
this the normative evaluation of inequality.  
In addition to this disinterested reaction to income inequality, the individuals who we 
analyse when we carry out experimental or survey analysis do actually live in the society in 
question: their own income then forms part of the income distribution in which we are 
interested. This second inequality effect is at the individual level: income inequality will 
directly impact both the absolute income that individuals receive, and how much richer and 
poorer they are compared to others. The attitude to inequality here is not disinterested but 
rather self-interested, with the additional assumption that individuals care not only about how 
much income they receive but also about how much they receive compared to others. We will 
below call this the comparative evaluation of inequality. 
The effect of the distribution of income on individual well-being will likely run through 
both of these channels. Even though income inequality as such in a society is not an 
individual-level concept, any distribution of income will have individual-level effects due to 
the way in which it changes the individual's own income and their standing with respect to 
those who are richer and poorer, as will be discussed below. 
In the context of relative standing or comparisons, individual attitudes to inequality will 
depend critically on the reference group that the individual has in mind. This term was first 
used by Hyman (1942) in work on the evaluation of the rankings that individuals assign to 
themselves, and refers to the group or individuals to which or whom they compare themselves 
for the purpose of self-appraisal. The term has subsequently been refined and expanded in 
numerous contributions across the social sciences, with various definitions of the term now 
being proposed. Kelley (1952) distinguishes between two roles that any such reference group 
can play, and hence proposes separate definitions of the comparative and normative reference 
groups.  
The first of these, the comparative reference group, is in the spirit of the original 
interpretation given by Hyman whereby the reference group acts as the standard of 
comparison for self-appraisal. The normative reference group is the source of norms, attitudes 
and values of the individuals concerned. Both groups can be further distinguished according 
to whether the individual in question is or is not a member of the reference group. 
Reinterpreting Shibutani’s (1955) proposed conception of the terms, a comparative reference 
group is the point of comparison allowing the individual's own status to be calculated when 
the individual is part of the group (as in Hyman). However, the individual need not (yet) be 
part of the reference group. When the individual is not part of the group, but aspires to be, the 
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reference group acts as a relative aspiration, that is as the group of which the individual 
desires to be a member. A normative reference group is that whose perspectives constitute the 
frame of reference for the individual, and again a distinction between membership and non-
membership can be effected. In the latter case, individuals may adopt the behaviour of the 
group as a result of anticipatory socialization (see Merton and Kitt, 1950). 
Regarding the subject matter of the current chapter, the reaction of an individual to 
income inequality will depend on both the role assumed by the reference group and her 
membership status in the group. In a comparative reference group, of which the individual is a 
member, individual well-being is commonly assumed to be negatively affected by those who 
earn more than the individual, but positively affected by those who earn less. We say that the 
individual experiences relative deprivation from the income gaps with respect to those who 
are richer than she is in the reference group, but relative satisfaction from the income gaps 
with respect to those who are poorer. Both relative deprivation and relative satisfaction will 
very likely depend on the degree of income inequality within the reference group. 
Comparative reference groups may also matter even if the individual is not currently a 
member of the group. If the individual aspires to be part of the group in question, then 
comparisons with respect to richer individuals in the group may give rise to positive feelings, 
as the individual anticipates being as rich as the group members once they join the group. This 
idea of a comparative reference group to which the individual aspires is akin to that of the 
tunnel effect in Hirschman (1973), which will be referred to in Section 2.1 below. 
The rationale behind this comparative view of reference groups is that one’s own 
position relative to others matters. We do not imagine that this is the only way in which 
others’ outcomes may be viewed by the individual. It is very likely indeed that some groups 
will not be considered comparatively, but instead viewed with some kind of extended 
sympathy. The individuals to whom one compares and those for whom one feels sympathy 
are probably not going to be the same. As such, we may well see individuals whose position 
relative to their neighbours or work colleagues is paramount, but who at the same time vote 
for social programmes for those in need or give money to international charities. Here 
individuals have a preference for making some others better-off. We will explore this idea of 
empathy or altruism a little more in Section 4.4. 
As opposed to the comparative view of reference groups, inequality in the normative 
view of reference groups is evaluated by the individual irrespective of where she appears in 
the distribution, or even irrespective of whether she appears in it at all. Concretely, a given 
distribution of income will be evaluated in the same way by an individual regardless of 
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whether she is in the top or bottom quartile of the distribution, so that there is no role for 
comparisons to the richer and poorer in the normative reference group. Equally, we can all 
now have a normative opinion about the distribution of income in our own countries in the 
19th Century, even though we do not appear in that distribution ourselves. The normative 
evaluation of an income distribution can also be thought of as a mirror of preferences over 
inequality under the veil of ignorance (where the individual does not know where she will 
eventually be situated in the distribution).3 
Both the normative and comparative view of income inequality will likely depend on 
how the distribution of income came about. We expect individuals to be more tolerant of the 
income gaps that result from effort than those that come about by luck. We will consider some 
of the work on the fairness of the income distribution further in Section 4.3 below. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 below considers 
empirical evidence for an impact of income inequality in the context of a comparative 
reference group. We appeal to two different ways via which we can evaluate whether income 
inequality does indeed reduce the well-being the individuals who are exposed to it. The first 
approach relies on various measures of subjective well-being as proxies for individual utility: 
these are used to establish whether income disparities are indeed significantly associated with 
measures of individual well-being (such as happiness or life satisfaction).4 The second is to 
see whether individuals behave as if they wish to avoid income inequality. This is tantamount 
to a revealed-preference argument. As it is anything but obvious to obtain clean measures of 
behaviour and match these to income inequality in the field, we turn to experimental 
techniques in the laboratory to make progress here. Section 3 then follows the same structure, 
but this time with respect to the normative evaluation of income distributions. We propose a 
number of extensions, outstanding issues and suggestions for future research in Section 4. 
Last, Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Considering only the level of one’s own income, a richer-than-mean-income “impartial observer” will be more 
inequality-averse when she is not involved in the distribution of income (this is the pure normative preference) as 
compared to the case in which she is present in it. 
4 This kind of subjective well-being literature has grown very quickly over the past couple of decades. As an 
example, all three of the top-cited articles published in the Economic Journal over the past 20 years have the 
word “happiness” in their title. 
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2. The comparative view 
When the reference group is viewed comparatively, individuals are not indifferent to 
others, and compare to them in order to evaluate their own status in society.5 If the individual 
is a member of this reference group then higher incomes for others will reduce her well-being, 
while lower incomes have the opposite effect. Alternatively, if she is not in the reference 
group, but would like to be, then higher incomes will have a positive effect on her well-being. 
In both cases income disparities amongst others will be correlated with individual well-being. 
We first consider evidence for the importance of such comparisons to others based on 
the measures of subjective well-being that are by now commonly available in many sources of 
survey data, before turning to the complementary work in experimental economics. 
 
2.1    Subjective well-being and others' income 
Arguably inspired by the salience of the Easterlin paradox6 (Easterlin, 1974), and the 
increasing availability of information on various measures of subjective well-being in large-
scale (including panel) datasets, there is by now quite a considerable stock of work on the 
relationship between income and well-being. One of the key questions in this literature has 
been ‘Does money buy happiness’? In standard economic theory, individual utility is not 
supposed to be affected by the behaviour or income of others, unless these latter impose an 
externality on the individual.  
In the context of the comparative reference group evoked above, however, the incomes 
of others in the reference group do indeed impose just such an externality. An increase in the 
income of others reduces the individual's well-being, through either greater relative 
deprivation or lower relative satisfaction (depending on whether the others whose income 
rises earn more or less than the individual in question), while analogously a reduction in 
others' income increases the individual's well-being.  
There are any number of ways of attempting to show that individual well-being depends 
negatively on others' income. These were surveyed in Clark et al. (2008), and as such the 
                                                 
5 Very generally, an individual’s perception of inequality may depend on where she stands in the income 
distribution. An early contribution in this respect is Van Praag (1977). 
6 This paradox is based on an opposition of the cross-section and time-series estimates of the relationship 
between subjective well-being and income. At any point in time, richer individuals are typically happier than 
poorer individuals. But as per capita GDP rises over time, Easterlin suggested that average subjective well-being 
remains flat in many countries. The extent to which subjective well-being is actually flat over time is the subject 
of quite heated debate (for example, Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008, and Easterlin et al., 2010). The comparison of 
my income or consumption to that of others (or to myself in the past) has often been proposed as an explanation 
for this paradox.  
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current section will only provide a shorter run-through of some of the relevant findings. Of 
course, comparisons need not be restricted to income, and may well refer to comparisons of 
consumption, as initially suggested by Veblen (1949) and demonstrated empirically by, 
amongst others, Bloch et al. (2004), Brown et al. (2011) and Heffetz (2011). Comparisons 
could also cover leisure (Frijters and Leigh, 2008) or arguably almost any other observable 
economic attribute. 
Some of the empirical work on the comparison of income has used a revealed-
preference approach, in which observed measures of labour supply or consumption are argued 
to be more consistent with a relative utility function, in which either income or some 
consumption goods are compared to those of others in the reference group. A number of 
pieces of evidence along these lines can be found, for example, in Frank (1999), Layard 
(2005) and Schor (1992).  
It is always difficult to convince sceptics that any such correlations do indeed reflect 
spillover effects within the utility function, rather than learning, a hidden common factor 
within the reference group, or endogenous selection into the reference group. The tightest 
evidence in this respect may well come from natural experiments, in which either reference 
group income or consumption randomly changes. A small number of these experiments are 
described below. 
Card et al. (2012) appeal not to expected outcomes but rather the revelation of 
information on others' earnings. The natural experiment here is a court decision that made the 
salary of any California state employee public knowledge. A local newspaper set up a website 
making it easy to find this information. Following this website launch, Card et al. informed a 
random subset of employees at three University of California campuses about the site. Some 
days later, all employees on the three campuses were surveyed. Comparing those in the 
treatment group (informed about the website) to others reveals the impact of information 
regarding others' salaries. The reference group in this work was defined as co-workers in the 
same occupational group (faculty vs. staff) and administrative unit in the university. Finding 
out about others' earnings should reduce the well-being of those who find themselves to be 
relatively less well-paid than others in the reference group, and increase it if they find 
themselves to be better paid. The survey did indeed find lower job satisfaction for those with 
pay below the reference group median and a greater intention to look for a new job. The effect 
on both of these variables for those who were relatively well-paid was insignificant. There is 
in addition some evidence of an actual quitting effect on those who were found to be in the 
bottom earnings quartile in the reference group. 
 7
Kuhn et al. (2011) consider observed large changes in close neighbours’ incomes, 
which result from the design of the Dutch postcode lottery. Each week, this lottery randomly 
selects a postal code, and allocates a prize of €12,500 per lottery ticket purchased within the 
postcode. In addition, one participating household in the winning postcode receives a new 
BMW. These postcodes are small, comprising on average about 20 households. Individuals 
who do not live in the winning postcode area, and those who do but did not buy a ticket, 
receive nothing. Households in winning postcodes were surveyed six months after the prize 
was won. One of the paper's key findings is that lottery non-participants in winning postcodes 
(who live next door to winners) are significantly more likely to have purchased a new car 
since the date of the lottery draw than are other non-participants, as if individuals do indeed 
compare their own car to that of their near neighbours. 
A last example of a natural experiment is one in which comparisons to a reference 
position or an expectation (rather than comparison to other individuals) affect observable 
behaviour (rather than subjective well-being). In New Jersey, police unions bargain over 
wages with their municipal employer and, in cases of dispute, an outside arbitrator has the 
final say. Mas (2006) finds that the per capita number of crimes solved (cleared) is 12% 
higher when the unions win their case compared to when they lose. He concludes that “the 
change in performance of police officers following an arbitration loss depends not only on the 
amount of the pay raise, but on the counteroffer that was demanded but never implemented as 
well” (p.785). 
Natural experiments of this kind are relatively rare. A great deal of work has instead 
appealed to survey data, and modelled subjective well-being as a function of both the 
individual's own income and the income of a plausible reference group. This latter reference 
group is almost always imposed by the researcher as some measure of the income earned by 
those who are of the same age, sex and education, for example, or who live in the same 
region, or (in the case of linked employer-employee data, as in Brown et al., 2006, and Clark 
et al., 2009b) who work in the same firm. Direct information on who is in the individual's 
reference group in survey data is very rare (an exception is Clark and Senik, 2010).  
Some of the by now large body of empirical literature is surveyed in Section 3.1 of 
Clark et al. (2008). For the income of ‘people like you’, Clark and Oswald (1996) use the first 
wave of British Household Panel Study (BHPS) data to show that the estimated coefficients 
on income and others' income in a job-satisfaction equation are statistically equal and 
opposite, which is compatible with the Easterlin paradox. An early contribution by Cappelli 
and Sherer (1988) considered workers in the airline industry. The authors appeal to an 
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occupational definition of others' earnings, and show that individual pay satisfaction is 
negatively correlated with an outside ‘market wage’, which is average pay by occupation in 
other airlines. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) relates life satisfaction in the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) to average income defined by sex, age and education; Luttmer 
(2005) also considers life satisfaction, which is shown to be negatively correlated with 
average income by local area identified in a number of waves of the US National Survey of 
Families and Households. 
Instead of modelling reported subjective well-being as a function of own and others' 
income, an alternative is to ask how much income individuals need to attain a certain level of 
well-being. This is the method used in the Welfare Function of Income, associated with the 
Leyden school in the Netherlands. In this project, individuals are asked to assign income 
levels (per period) to a number of different verbal labels (such as “excellent”, “good”, 
“sufficient” and “bad”). It is then possible to estimate an individual lognormal ‘Welfare 
Function of Income’ using the responses for each individual: this function shows how much 
income each individual needs in order to hit a certain level of well-being. The estimated 
means (i) of these lognormal functions can then be used as the dependent variable in 
regressions seeking to explain which types of individuals require a higher level of income in 
order to be satisfied. The mean  was found to be positively correlated with reference-group 
income (average income by age, education and certain other individual or job characteristics): 
see Hagenaars (1986) and Van de Stadt et al. (1985). In other words, when the income of the 
reference group is higher, individuals need more money to attain a certain stated level of 
utility. 
To date we have discussed empirical results that are consistent with a comparative 
reference group of which the individual is a member. The discussion in Section 1 above 
revealed a possible counteracting effect when incomes rise in a comparative reference group 
to which the individual aspires, but of which she is not yet a member. Some work has indeed 
found that individual well-being is positively correlated with reference group income, and has 
attempted to interpret this correlation in the light of aspirations and future outcomes. A 
positive correlation between my own well-being and others’ income is consistent with 
Hirschman’s tunnel effect, where others' earnings provide information about my own future 
prospects. In the terminology of Manski (2000), these are expectations interactions, where the 
individual updates their information set based on others' outcomes. The tunnel effect relates to 
the literature on the ‘prospect of upward mobility’ (POUM), where both current and future 
income matter. This will be discussed further in Section 4.3 below. 
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Clark et al. (2009b) make the point that the estimated coefficient on others' earnings in 
a typical subjective well-being equation will likely mix together the comparison element 
(comprising relative deprivation and relative satisfaction, as discussed above) and the relative 
aspiration effect of the group to which the individual aspires. In the associated literature, this 
latter is often called an information or signal effect (whereas the former is called a jealousy or 
status effect). Positive subjective well-being effects from others’ income are found, for 
example, in Senik (2004), Kingdon and Knight (2007) and Clark et al. (2009b). In each of 
these, the case can be made that the retained measure of others' income contains some element 
of my own likely future outcomes: an information or aspiration role for others’ income is 
more likely the greater my probability of accession to the reference group in question. As will 
be discussed in Section 3.1 below, the inversion in the correlation between satisfaction and 
overall income inequality in Grosfeld and Senik (2010) in Poland can be interpreted in the 
light of such a tunnel effect. Individuals were initially happy with others’ higher incomes 
(towards the top end of the income distribution), as this was thought to reflect their own future 
opportunities. Once it became clear that only relatively few people were actually going to be 
able to accede to these incomes, the correlation with satisfaction became more comparative, 
with a net negative effect in the later years of their sample.  
Before describing the results of this literature any further, it is useful to set out the 
models of income comparisons formally. There is a fixed set  of  
individuals whose incomes are recorded in an income distribution , where 
 is the set of n-dimensional vectors with non-negative components. The mean of x is λ(x). 
For ,  is the set of individuals with income greater than that of i, 
known as the Better-off set; analogously,  is the set of individuals who 
have an income which is lower than that of i, the Worse-off set.  
In the income-distribution literature, the most significant role of relative standing is in 
the determination of deprivation and satisfaction, which is related to inequality measurement 
as we will see below. As opposed to measures of income inequality, deprivation and 
satisfaction are defined at the individual level and aim to capture individuals’ reactions when 
they compare their situation to that of others who have different levels of income (or of some 
other variable). Deprivation “involve(s) a comparison with the imagined situation of some 
other person or group. This other person or group is the ‘reference group’, or more 
accurately the ‘comparative reference group’” (Runciman, 1966, p. 11). In this literature, it is 
generally assumed that the reference group is the entire society. 
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The definition of relative deprivation adopted is the following: “We can roughly say 
that [a person] is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other 
person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X 
(whether or not this is or will be in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as 
feasible that he should have X” (Runciman, 1966, p.10). When we consider income as the 
object of relative deprivation, which is the X in the above citation, then individual deprivation 
is simply the sum of the gaps between an individual's income and the incomes of all 
individuals richer than her.  
Formally, Hey and Lambert (1980) specify the deprivation felt by someone with income 




In this case, as also suggested by Yitzhaki (1979), the deprivation function of an individual 
with income  is the sum of all the gaps to those in the better-off set divided by the number 
of individuals in the society: 
 
 
Aggregate deprivation, that is deprivation at a societal level, is then given by the 
average value of all of the individual deprivations. This aggregate deprivation turns out to the 
absolute Gini coefficient, which is given by the most popular index of income inequality (the 
Gini coefficient) multiplied by mean income. 
Following on from these early contributions, Chakravarty (1997) proposed the inclusion 
of mean income in the measurement of individual deprivation. The latter now becomes the 
gap as a fraction of mean income, . This normalization is argued to be more 
appropriate for the comparison of the same society at different points in time, or different 
societies. When we use this formulation, aggregate deprivation is equal to the Gini 
coefficient, which is the absolute Gini index divided by mean income. 
Analogously, income can be compared to those who are poorer than the individual in 
question, i.e. those who are in the worse-off set. This comparison yields the relative 




These measures of deprivation and satisfaction are called disadvantageous and 
advantageous inequality in Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) utility function. On this point 
Runciman (1966, p.9) writes: “If people have no reason to expect or hope for more than they 
can achieve, they will be less discontent with what they have, or even grateful simply to be 
able to hold on to it. But if, on the other hand, they have been led to see as a possible goal the 
relative prosperity of some more fortunate community with which they can directly compare 
themselves, then they will remain discontent with their lot until they have succeeded in 
catch
s not manna from heaven, and how that income comes 
about
e differences between the individual and those who are better 
off (th
ing up”. 
While Fehr and Schmidt imagine that individuals are averse to both kinds of inequality, 
in the income-distribution literature it is most often implicitly assumed that individual well-
being depends negatively on relative deprivation but positively on relative satisfaction. One of 
the main reasons for individuals not being inequality-averse, as will be set out in the 
following section, is that real income i
 matters for individual attitudes. 
This same concept of deprivation, which is at the core of the Gini coefficient, is also 
found also in the literature of polarisation (see Chapter 6). Deprivation is there called 
alienation. In general, alienation is assumed to be symmetric, while only the comparison to 
better-off individuals matters for deprivation. The interaction between alienation and 
identification is at the basis of the measure of polarisation proposed by Esteban and Ray 
(1994).  Bossert et al. (2007) reinterpret alienation and (the lack of) identification in terms of 
deprivation in a multivariate setting where functioning failures are analysed. In this setting, 
individual deprivation is a multiple of the product of the share of agents with fewer 
functioning failures than the agent under consideration (the lack of identification) and the 
average of the functioning-failur
e alienation component). 
The empirical subjective well-being literature described in this sub-section has arguably 
made a key contribution in reminding social scientists (and maybe especially economists) that 
there are spillovers in individual income. The more you earn, the less happy I am, if you are in 
my reference group. Unless you are in a reference group to which I aspire, in which case my 
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subje
-section, we practically never ask individuals 
about
ers. Someone who has 
an inc
                                                
ctive well-being may well be higher (your position today provides me with an idea of 
what I can aspire to tomorrow).  
The news is not only good, however. It can be argued that there are a number of 
drawbacks in this literature. In particular, the pertinent reference group is only a guess at who 
really matters in terms of the individual's own specific group that matters for income 
comparisons. In almost all cases, the best that we can do is use a series of likely reference 
groups and show that the effect of others' incomes seems to be consistent across them. An 
arguably useful piece of additional information comes from the identification of reference 
groups to which the individual aspires (for which there is an information or signal effect): we 
expect the correlation between individual subjective well-being and others' income in these 
groups to be less negative, or even positive. Even so, in both cases we can only guess at the 
correct reference group, with obvious implications for the accurate measurement of the 
relevant income gaps. As noted earlier in this sub
 their comparative reference group, and have to our knowledge never asked about the 
reference group to which the individual aspires.  
In the context of contributing to the analysis of relative deprivation and relative 
satisfaction described above, this literature has also not been an overwhelming success. 
Almost every paper here appeals to one single measure of the centrality of others' incomes, 
independently of whether the individual in question finds herself above or below that level. 
As such, there has been little attempt to distinguish relative deprivation from satisfaction.7 
Equally, knowing both my own income and the mean (or median) of my reference group 
income actually tells me fairly little about the gaps between me and oth
ome of 1000 Euros above the mean or median reference-group income, say, can have 
widely-varying values of relative deprivation and relative satisfaction. 
The set of empirical subjective well-being work explicitly appealing to deprivation and 
satisfaction is not entirely empty. D’Ambrosio and Frick (2007) provide an empirical 
counterpart to the theoretical measures above by exploring the relationship between self-
reported income satisfaction and relative deprivation. Using panel data from the SOEP, they 
show that subjective well-being depends more on a measure of relative deprivation than it 
does on absolute income, since the correlation between income satisfaction and absolute 
 
7 One exception, which arguably does fall into the group of survey work on satisfaction, is Loewenstein et al. 
(1989). Here individuals evaluate a series of hypothetical scenarios involving disputes between two people, 
where they are told to assume the role of one of the individuals, and evaluate how satisfied they are with the final 
outcome in each situation. These satisfaction scores are shown to be related to both own and the other person’s 
payoff. The correlation between satisfaction and advantageous inequality is much weaker than that with 
disadvantageous inequality. 
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income is 0.357 while that between satisfaction and relative deprivation is larger in absolute 
value at -0.439. As predicted by the income-distribution literature, the effect of relative 
deprivation on well-being is negative. This finding holds even after controlling for other 
influential determinants of well-being in a multivariate setting. Cojocaru (2014a) also 
estimates an individual well-being regression as a function of advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequality in the reference group, using uses 2006 data from the Life in 
Trans
can be effected for 
the m
ition Survey (LiTS). Disadvantageous inequality is associated with lower life 
satisfaction, but advantageous inequality is not significantly so. 
Bossert and D'Ambrosio (2007) introduce time as an additional dimension in the 
determination of the level of deprivation felt by an individual. They suggest that, as is usual, 
an individual's feeling of relative deprivation today depends on a comparison with those who 
are better off today. They then propose an additional consideration: the feeling of deprivation 
relative to someone who has a higher income today is more pronounced if this someone was 
not better off than the individual in question yesterday. In other words, relative deprivation is 
more keenly felt relative to those who, between yesterday and today, have passed the 
individual in question in the income distribution. Individual relative deprivation in this 
framework is then determined by the interaction of two components: the average gap between 
the individual's income and the incomes of all those who are richer than her (this is the 
traditional way of measuring deprivation), and a function of the number of people who were 
ranked below or equal in the previous period’s distribution but who are now above the 
individual in question in the current distribution. A similar modification 
easurement of relative satisfaction, with the latter rising with the number of people that 
the individual has passed in the distribution between yesterday and today. 
In a similar spirit to Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2007), D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012) 
propose a utility function including dynamic-status considerations which is tested on SOEP 
data. Individual well-being, measured in the SOEP by individual income or life satisfaction, 
depends at time  on four different elements: (i) the absolute component, i.e. the standard of 
living of the individual at time ; (ii) the absolute dynamic component, i.e. how the 
individual’s own income changed between  and ; (iii) the relative component, which is 
the individual’s income ime  at t  compared to others’ incomes at time ; and (iv) the relative 
dynamic component, which reveals how the result of the individual’s income comparison in 
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(iii) changed between and . This utility function is a generalization of that proposed by 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), with the addition of individuals' income histories.8 
This separation of income comparisons into those with respect to richer and poorer 




alls; but this status effect may be 
dimin
dividual in question, can be argued to shed some light on the debate regarding the 
potential status and signal effects of comparison income. 
Individual wellbeing being negatively affected by comparisons to those who are 
permanently richer (and positively affected by comparisons to the permanently poorer) is 
completely in line with the standard empirical findings in the literature on relative income. At 
the same time, the presence of newly richer and poorer individuals can be argued to play the 
informational role described in Hirschman’s (1973) tunnel effect. Someone who is today 
richer than me, but was yesterday poorer than me provides me with a positive signal about my 
own future prospects. And indeed in the empirical application, D’Ambrosio and Frick (2012) 
show that individual satisfaction is positively correlated with the income today of such 
people. Analogously, the income gap with respect to those who are now behind the individual 
but who were ahead of her reduces the individual’s satisfaction, which is consistent with a 
negative signal that the individual could well be one of this group tomorrow. Finding such an 
effect in an advanced stable economy such as Germany is new and perhaps u
revious work in the literature had rather underlined the relevance of the tunnel effect in 
societies that were either volatile or in earlier stages of economic development.  
The broad conclusion from this work, which is by now far too voluminous to be listed 
in detail, is that others’ incomes often do play a role in determining my well-being. As the 
income of others to whom I compare rises, my well-being f
ished or even entirely neutralised by a signal effect if what happens to others today 
informs me about what may happen to me in the future. 
In general, however, the link between the formal models of income gaps (which are 
behind the measurement of inequality) and empirical work in the subjective well-being 
literature has been weak. The subjective well-being spillovers in society consist of a many-to-
many mapping. As incomes in a society change, we both need to know who is affected by a 
movement in the income of individual i, and who is in individual i’s reference group. We then 
have to identify the nature of the relationship between each pair: relative deprivation, relative 
                                                 
8 Senik (2009) uses 2006 LiTS data, covering 28 post-Transition countries (plus Turkey). She concludes that 
dynamic income comparisons (to oneself in the past) are more important than
benchmarks.  
 a number of other comparison 
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satisfaction, or rather aspirations? Put in this light, it is obvious that we are asking a great deal 
n standard surveys, all of which contain significant 
lacun
2.2   
Weiss, 1993), amongst others. A theory of social interactions has 
been 
f and Kranton (2000) for the second. Sobel (2005) 
provides a thought-provoking discussion of the similarities and differences between these two 
of the information that is contained i
ae in this respect. To complement our understanding of how my well-being depends on 
my comparison to your income, we turn to experimental economics, where all of the relevant 
parameters of the comparison process can arguably be controlled.  
 
   Experimental economics 
Experimentalists appeal to the notion of interdependence in preferences to explain the 
behaviour of subjects who repeatedly violate game-theoretic predictions. Extensive surveys of 
work in this area can be found in Fehr and Schmidt (2003), Sobel (2005) and Camerer and 
Fehr (2006).  
Interdependent preferences, that is preferences that depend directly on the situation of 
others, were modelled formally for the first time in the theory of consumer demand. The 
phenomenon whereby individual utility functions depend on other people's income or 
consumption is known generically as the relative income hypothesis (Duesenberry, 1949). 
This can be further differentiated into Keeping up with the Joneses, where the preference 
interaction with others depends on current consumption, and Catching up with the Joneses 
where it depends on lagged consumption. Leibenstein (1950) was the first to introduce 
demand functions that explicitly took into account the desire to be ‘in style’, bandwagon and 
snob effects, and conspicuous consumption. Since then the literature has advanced to a 
considerable degree of sophistication, exploring the implications of such preferences on the 
theory of asset pricing (Abel, 1990, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, Galí, 1994), Pareto 
optimality (Collard, 1975, and Shall, 1972), the theory of optimal taxation (Aronsson and 
Johansson-Stenman, 2008, Boskin and Sheshinki, 1978, Dupor and Liu, 2003, Ljungqvist and 
Uhlig, 2000, and Abel, 2005), the determination of work hours (Bell and Freeman, 2001, 
Bowles and Park, 2005), public spending (Ng, 1987), and the allocation of resources in 
general (Fershtman and 
proposed using varying formulations, where preferences are either defined over general 
consumption goods or an individual's identity. See Becker (1974) and Stigler and Becker 
(1977) for the first group, and Akerlo
strands of the literature. 
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Experimental work has made significant contributions to this area, in particular in 
considering the distribution of income across players, and distinguishing between doing better 
than others and doing worse than them. 
 
2.2.1 Models of the distribution of income 
The experimental economics literature fully incorporated distributional concerns into 
the u
), to whom the definition of inequity aversion is due, put it.  
pends on the individual’s own income 
and th
e analysed in 
what follows: preferences in Charness and Rabin are a combination of the individual’s own 
payoff and the payoff of the worst-off individual only. 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who we henceforth call FS, propose a utility function for 
individual i, 
tility function for the first time in Bolton (1991), with the modelling of inequity or 
inequality aversion. The two terms are very often used as synonyms in the literature to refer to 
the single phenomenon: that “people resist inequitable outcomes; i.e. the fact that they are 
willing to give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more equitable outcomes” 
as Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p.819
The effect of inequality clearly results from some comparison being made to the 
reference group. On this point Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p.819) continue by explaining that 
“Inequity aversion is self-centered if people do not care per se about inequality that exists 
among other people but are only interested in the fairness of their own material payoff 
relative to the payoff of others”.  
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) incorporate inequality into the individual utility function via 
the inclusion of all of the pairs of the differences between the individual’s own income and 
others’ incomes. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), who refined the earlier work of Bolton (1991), 
propose an inequality-averse utility function which de
eir share of the total income. The survey in Engelmann and Strobel (2007) compares 
these two approaches, together with that of Charness and Rabin (2002). Charness and Rabin’s 
model is more related to social welfare than to inequality aversion, and will not b
, which depends on the individual’s own outcome, and the gaps to 




where . In this formulation, the utility of an individual depends positively on their 
own income, but negatively on both their levels of disadvantageous inequality (the gaps to 
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those who earn more than them: the second term in (1)) and advantageous inequality (the gaps 
to those who earn less than them: the third term in (1)). According to Fehr and Schmidt, 
indivi
is to their material disadvantage than from inequity that is to their material advantage” (Fehr 
 Schmidt, 1999, p.822  in
 and Competition (ERC) in which the individual utility function is given 
by 
duals dislike inequitable distributions. “They experience inequity if they are worse off in 
material terms than the other players in the experiment, and they also feel inequity if they are 
better off. (...) (H)owever, we assume that, in general, subjects suffer more from inequity that 
and ). As such, α is larger  absolute terms than is β. 
In the approach taken by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), individuals are motivated by 
both their own pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing. They propose a theory of 
Equity, Reciprocity
. The derivative of with respect to the second argument is non-
monotonic, exhibiting a hump-shape. This utility function satisfies a number of properties 
and, in a two-player game, with player i and j, one example of such an additively-separable 
utility function is: 
 
 
where  In equation (2), the utility of player i rises with her share of income when 
her share is under 50%, and falls with her share when this share is over 50%.  
In most experiments, these two models (FS and ERC) yield similar predictions. 
However, the predicted outcomes can differ for games where there are three or more players, 
since ERC is not sensitive to all of the inequalities in payoffs. In the ERC formulation, 
individuals want the average payoff of others to be as close as possible to their own but do not 
dislike the presence of richer and poorer individuals per se; in Fehr and Schmidt, individuals 
dislike inequality in all of the outcomes. The experiment conducted in Engelmann and Strobel 
(2000) is designed to compare the performance of these two models: their results suggest that 
the formulation proposed by Fehr and Schmidt performs better than the ERC. A similar 
conclusion is reached by Dawes et al. (2007): humans appear to be strongly motivated by 
egalitarian preferences. 
The various contributions to the experimental literature measure inequality aversion via 
a number of alternative methods which we will describe below. We believe that the 
appropriate term that should be used here is indeed inequality aversion, and not the original 
one proposed of inequity aversion. All of the empirical contributions here are based on the 
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assumption that the equality of payoffs is the fair, and hence equitable, outcome. But this need 
not necessarily be the case. If the distribution of income is not random, but depends (or is 
thoug
le will then very likely differ among subjects (see the discussion in Tyran and 





l. Young and highly educated participants are one of the most 
selfish subgroups of the population under consideration. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), in their 
                                                
ht to depend) on individual effort or some other kind of merit-worthy individual 
characteristic, the individual’s view of what is equitable will depend on her own moral 
standards and the normative reference group. Opinions regarding what distribution of income 
is equitab
perimental work has test for the presence of inequality aversion and its consequence
onomic outcomes in a number of different settings, such as ultimatum games, dictator 
games, dynamic bargaining games, public-good games with punishment, and redistribution 
games.9 
 
2.2.2 Experimental evidence from Ultimatum, Dictator and Dynamic-Bargaining Games 
In the ultimatum game, some subjects, the proposers, are asked to suggest a division of 
a certain sum of money, say 100, between themselves and the other subjects, the responders. 
The proposer suggests a division which the responder can either accept or reject. If the latter 
accepts the proposal, both the proposer and the receiver receive the money in acc
roposed division; if the responder refuses, neither player receives anything. Both the 
proposer and the respondent are fully aware of the rules of the game. The standard economic 
prediction based on sub-game perfection is that the resulting outcomes will be very unequal: 
the proposer should make an offer of just over zero, and the responder should accept any 
positive offer that is made to them (as something is always better than nothing).  
This prediction is not borne out by the behaviour that is actually observed in the lab. 
The experimental results reveal a far more equal division of the pie, with responders 
frequently rejecting offers that are under 25% of the total sum (see Camerer, 2003, and Levitt 
and List, 2007; see also Thaler, 1988, for a more comprehensive discussion of the general 
anomalies of these results). Bellemare et al. (2008) provide representative estimates of 
inequality aversion for the Dutch population. They find considerable differences between 
socio-economic groups. Inequality aversion, in particular advantageous inequality, rises with 
age and falls with education leve
 
9 More unconventional experiments have also been carried out showing preferences for fair redistributions (in 
experimental settings where effort can be controlled for) amongst Capuchin monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal, 
2003) and 19-month old infants (Sloane et al., 2012). 
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surve
fering lower amounts. Even so, and despite the 
propo
to be burnt, and the authors conclude as to the presence of a certain amount of 
equity
e bargaining process can be 
exam mework, the experiments in Herreiner and Puppe (2010) show 
rs’ inequality aversion. For example, it is 
found
y of experimental results from the ultimatum game, note that the vast majority of offers 
are consequently between 40% and 50% of the total sum, and no offers are below 20%. These 
results seem to hold regardless of the size of the sum that is to be divided, and in particular are 
also found in high-stake games. 
The second type of experiment used to reveal preferences over inequality is the dictator 
game. This is a simple variation of the ultimatum game, with the advantage of being non-
strategic. Here, as the name suggests, the proposer behaves like a dictator in proposing a split 
of the sum to be divided, with the responder having to accept the offer and thus having no 
decision to make. Experiments using the dictator game yield, as perhaps might be expected, 
distributions of income between the two players that are less egalitarian than those from the 
ultimatum game above, with the proposer of
ser running no risk of rejection, positive amounts of money are still offered. The survey 
of 616 such experiments in Engel (2011) concludes that dictators give on average 28.35% of 
the sum of money to be split to the responder, which is far from the self-interested economic 
prediction of no money being offered at all.  
Abbink et al. (2009) also consider dictator games, but in the novel context of the 
destruction of others’ income. This destruction is both negatively and positively framed. In 
the latter, individuals can decide to award their partner 50 points, and by doing so gain 10 
points themselves. The decision not to make this award is analogous to the destruction of 50 
of their partner’s points at a cost of 10 points to themselves (and this is how the decision 
appears in the negative framing). Abbink et al. find destruction rates of about 25 per cent with 
both framings. One surprising finding is that initially-equal income distributions are actually 
more likely 
 aversion. One potential reading of this result is that, in their set up, the initially-equal 
distribution is the only one from which the individual can gain rank by burning money (see 
their Table 1). We will return to the question of the rank comparisons of income in Section 
4.2 below.  
Last, in dynamic bargaining games, the evolution of bargaining proposals over time and 
the reasons that individuals provide for their behaviour during th
ined jointly. In this fra
that Pareto-inferior solutions pertain due to the playe
 that a majority (51%) of bargaining partners will reject the unequal payoff distribution 
of (46, 75) in favour of the Pareto-inferior equal split of (45, 45). 
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2.2.3 Public-good contributions and punishment 
In the public-good game, players are given an endowment and then secretly choose how 
much of this endowment they wish to put into the public pot (in order to finance the supposed 
public good, which will benefit everyone) and how much they would like to keep for 
themselves. Once the donation decisions have been taken by all players, the total sum of 
mone
lt indicates that, 
irresp
order to punish others. This decision could be self-centred, as today’s punishment 
enhan
y in the public pot is multiplied by a factor of greater than one, and the resulting amount 
is evenly divided amongst all players. The Nash equilibrium in this game is for each player to 
contribute nothing to the public good. However, in experiments subjects are found to 
contribute an average of 40-60% of their endowment (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). 
The public-good game can be refined by introducing a second stage in which 
information on others’ contributions is provided, and players can punish each other. 
Introducing potential punishment in this second stage causes a sharp jump in co-operation in 
the first stage public-good game, as shown in Fehr and Gächter (2000). Masclet and Villeval 
(2008) assess the role of inequality aversion in determining individuals’ decisions to punish. 
They show that individuals will punish others even when this punishment does not 
immediately affect the distribution of payoffs (in some situations the cost of one punishment 
point to the punisher is the same as the cost of this point to the target). Consistent with 
previous work, punishers are not primarily motivated by a desire to increase equality. Inter-
individual comparisons of outcomes do play a decisive role in the punishment decision in all 
treatments: the intensity of punishment is strongly correlated with the size of the difference in 
contributions and earnings between the punisher and the target. This resu
ective of the willingness to directly reduce payoff differences, individuals may be 
willing to punish those whose decisions give rise to payoff differences, and that this inequality 
arouses emotions that trigger punishment. Punishment is shown to reduce inequality over 
time, as potential free-riders are incited to increase their contributions. 
An open question in this literature is why individuals decide to spend their own 
resources in 
ces my own future interests, or carried out altruistically in order to confer an advantage 
on my kin or group (see van Veelen, 2012). Of course, any pro-social behaviour can be self-
interested if we include non-pecuniary moral preferences in the utility function (Levitt and 
List, 2007). 
The sequential public-good game can be used to estimate separately the advantageous 
and disadvantageous inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In this game 
with two players, the first mover chooses his contribution to the public good under strategic 
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uncertainty, as he does not know what the second mover will decide. The second mover does 
know what the first mover has decided, and can choose to contribute either the same amount 
as the first mover or zero. Teyssier (2012) confirms the theoretical predictions: first movers 
with g
ents and decide 
how to redistribute from the rich to the poor by majority vote. On this point see also Farina 
olton and Ockenfels’s ERC can predict the 
oppos
 the fairness of outcomes. Another critique refers to the size 
of the
reater risk aversion or disadvantageous inequality aversion contribute less to the public 
good than do others, and second movers with a sufficiently high degree of advantageous 
inequality aversion contribute more than do others. (For an analysis of risk-aversion in the 
experimental literature see Section 3.2.) 
Inequality aversion as in Fehr and Schmidt has been also applied to the analysis of the 
results of voting over redistribution. While traditional economic models predict no 
redistribution, Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) show that inequality aversion can predict the 
opposite result in their experiments, in which subjects have different endowm
and Grimalda (2011). In taxation games, B
ite allocations to those in Fehr and Schmidt, as shown by Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004), since the middle class would no longer be in favour of redistribution. 
 
2.2.4 Deservingness: the source of income 
One of the critiques of inequality aversion models and the experiments used to test them 
is that they often neglect the procedure which is behind the money to be allocated. Money 
appears here out of nowhere as ‘manna from heaven’: see, on this point, Bergh (2008) and 
Güth et al. (2009), amongst many others. In the majority of experiments, income is an 
allocation, so that having more than others is not seen as being deserved. However, in many 
real-world applications individuals likely believe that they earn more than others because they 
deserve to do so. As might be imagined, when income is considered to reflect effort rather 
than luck the results do change. For example, Hoffman et al. (1994) report that when the role 
of proposer in the ultimatum game is earned, rather than being randomly assigned, proposers 
offer less and respondents are more likely to accept unequal offers. Similar results are found 
in Cherry et al. (2002) when the asset of the dictators in the bargaining game is legitimate. We 
will return to this point below in Section 4.3 when describing some evidence from the 
income-distribution literature on
 stakes, with the suggestion that inequality aversion may be lower when the stakes are 
high. See on this point the discussion in Eckel and Gintis (2010), who conclude that this fact 
does not refute the theory but is rather a proof of the rationality of subjects who take the costs 
of their behaviour into account. 
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A more general criticism of FS which calls the scientific basis of their method into 
question is contained in the various contributions of Shaked, and Binmore and Shaked. The 
detail
rease it by ten 
round
0.02, 0.05 and 0.25 of a money unit per money unit burnt.  
 here are higher than those in Abbink et al. (2009), which 
may well reflect that the average burning price here is lower. There is little evidence of a price 
 of 0.25. In the context of the current 
paper
 to make choices over hypothetical states of the world in 
s can be found in the January 2010 special issue “On the Methodology of Experimental 
Economics” of the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. This special issue includes 
the critique by Binmore and Shaked (2010a), the replies by Fehr and Schmidt (2010) and 
Eckel and Gintis (2010), and the rejoinder by Binmore and Shaked (2010b). 
A novel test of the desire to change the income distribution, and the provenance of the 
income in question, appears in Zizzo and Oswald (2001). Rather than taking money from one 
person and giving it to another, participants in this experiment are allowed (at a cost to 
themselves) to destroy each other’s earnings. This is the ‘negative framing’ of the destruction 
described in Abbink et al. (2009) above. Participants played in groups of four. Each 
participant has the same amount of money to start with, and can attempt to inc
s of betting on a number (1, 2 or 3) that is randomly chosen by a computer. A maximum 
amount per round can be wagered. This betting stage creates an unequal distribution of 
income. In the second stage, players can pay to burn each other’s earnings, at a price to 
themselves of 0.01, 
While the initial distribution of income is equal, two of the four players in each group 
are favoured. These players can bet more than the others in each round of the betting stage, 
and they in addition receive a cash bonus between the betting and burning stages. This is 
public knowledge.  
The results in Zizzo and Oswald show a remarkable amount of destruction. Just under 
two-thirds of players burnt some money, and the average player had just shy of half of their 
earnings burnt. The destruction rates
elasticity of burning, except at the top burning-cost rate
, richer players were burnt more, but especially the two players who had received an 
unfair advantage were burnt more.  
 
2.2.5 Hypothetical preferences and Neuro evidence 
Inequality aversion runs counter to the hypothesis that individuals are status-seeking, as 
noted by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, p.172). The concern for relative standing is the focus of 
another set of contributions in experimental economics (see Alpizar et al., 2005, Johansson-
Stenman et al., 2002, Solnick and Hemenway, 1998, and Yamada and Sato, 2013). The 
approach here is to allow individuals
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order
 own income and average societal income. The greater the 
importance of relative income, the more the individual will be willing to give up own income 
to ach
re asked to choose 
between states A and B, as follows: 
00,000; others earn $200,000. 




 obtained from an additional 
dollar
 to understand how important absolute and relative outcomes are to them. In income 
terms, these are couched in terms of
ieve a better relative standing. 
For example, in Solnick and Hemenway (1998), individuals a
 
A: Your current yearly income is $50,000; others earn $25,000. 
B: Your current yearly income is $1
 
It is specified that ‘others’ refers to the average of other people in the society, and 
emphasised that ‘prices are what they are currently and prices (the purchasing power of 
money) are the same in States A and B’. 
The key in this hypothetical-choice literature is that respondents choose between one 
state in which they are better off in absolute terms and another in which they are better-off 
compared with others. All three papers find evidence of strong positional concerns over 
income, in that individuals report tha
tatus (choosing A over B above). The percentage who exhibit ‘relative’ preferences can 
be large: half of the respondents said that they preferred to have 50% less real income but 
higher relative income (i.e. they preferred A to B above): see Solnick and Hemenway (1998) 
and Solnick and Hemenway (2005).  
Such choice experiments are easy to couch in terms of consumption or other life 
domains, rather than income, as well. The taste for relative standing in Solnick and 
Hemenway (1998) is found to be strongest for attractiveness and supervisor's 
est for vacation time; in Alpizar et al. (2005) it is stronger for cars and housing, and 
weaker for vacations and insurance. A useful extension in Corazzini et al. (2012) is to take the 
approach outside of only rich countries: in their work, respondents in high-income countries 
are more concerned by relative standing than are those in lower-income countries. 
Most of these experiments have been conducted with students, which is the standard 
practice in experimental economics. Carlsson et al. (2007) is the first study that is based on a 
random sample of the population as a whole. Their results are comparable to those in Alpizar 
et al. (2005), who found that on average about half of the utility
 comes from relative concerns. Carlsson et al. (2007) report that, on average, 45% of the 
utility increase from a small income increase arises from enjoying a higher relative income, a 
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result which is halfway between 100% (corresponding to the hypothesis that only relative 
income matters) and 0% (where only absolute income matters). 
A final set of experimental results comes from the recent NeuroEconomics literature. 
Fließbach et al. (2007) appeals to MRI techniques to measure the brain activity of pairs of 
individuals who carry out identical evaluation tasks in different scanners. If the individual 
succeeds in the task (remembering the number of blue dots on a previous screen, which they 
see for one and a half seconds), they obtain a monetary reward of a certain size, as indicated 
on their computer screen. The outcome of the other player (their success, and the amount won 
if the answer was correct) is shown at the same time. Fließbach and colleagues manipulate 
both the amount the individual wins if correct and the amount the other player wins in order to 
create
antageous inequality.10 Dohmen et al. (2011) also 
use th
ated effect of both 
incom
                                                
 a number of contrasting conditions. For example, in their conditions C6, C8 and C11, 
the individual always win 60 Euros if his answer is correct (all participants are men), but the 
other player wins, if correct, 120, 60 and 30 Euros respectively. One of each individual 
subject’s many trials was randomly picked for payment after the end of the experiment. 
The results show that relative incomes matter. Holding the subject’s own earnings 
constant, the amount earned by the other player is significantly correlated with blood 
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) responses in the ventral striatum, one of the regions of 
the brain known to be involved in the processing of rewards. Wu et al. (2012) also find 
evidence of social comparisons in brain activity, and suggest that it mostly appears in later 
cognitive appraisals and re-appraisals, rather than in the initial evaluation stage. Recent 
follow-up work by Fließbach et al. (2012) repeats their 2007 experiment, but this time with 
both men and women, and distinguishes between advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequality. Disadvantageous inequality is shown to have a much larger impact on brain 
activity in the ventral striatum than does adv
e same experiment, and show in a regression analysis that the effects of own and others’ 
income on activation in the ventral striatum are equal and opposite (which was also true in the 
2007 experiment). This holds for both men and women, although the estim
e variables is larger in size for men.  
 
10 In a completely different setting, Cohn et al. (2014) also conclude that disadvantageous inequality matters 
more for effort decisions in a laboratory experiment than does advantageous inequality. Specifically, in a field 
experiment, individuals who reported that they were underpaid at an initial base wage increase their performance 
as the hourly wage rises; there is no such effect for those who report being adequately paid or overpaid. Cohn et 
al. further show that this distinction in the effort response to wages is only found for subjects who display 
positive reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. 
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Somewhat similar in intent, although the experiment here consisted of individuals 
reading written reports on (fictitious) others, who are superior or inferior to the respondent, 
and the good or bad events that occur to them, is Takahashi et al. (2009).  
Dawes et al. (2012) explicitly consider redistribution and brain activity. They consider 
individual decisions to pay a cost to change the distribution of income within a group, where 
this latter distribution was determinedly randomly. Redistribution was correlated with brain 
activation in an area known to be correlated with social preferences. In addition, this brain 
activation was shown to be correlated with survey measures of egalitarian preferences that 
were elicited outside of the scanner. Zaki and Mitchell (2011) show that inequitable decision-
making (choosing to favour a smaller reward for oneself rather than a larger reward for the 
other player in a modified dictator game) is associated with brain activity in a region 
associated with subjective disutility. Last, Tricomi et al. (2010) explicitly address 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality by randomly assigning individuals in pairs to be 
rich (
argued to show that individuals 
have 
s, and in a comparative manner, via the 
variou
                                                
with $50) or poor (no dollars) after both have received an initial allocation of $30. Brain 
activity in areas known to be related to the valuation of stimuli is then measured via MRI as 
further transfers to both pairs are carried out. The results show that the ‘poor’ responded more 
strongly to transfers to themselves than to the other person, while the ‘rich’ evaluated 
transfers to others more strongly than transfers to self. This is 
social preferences over both advantageous and disadvantageous inequality.11 
The discussion in the current Section has shown that there is by now a considerable 
body of evidence consistent with individuals comparing their incomes with each other. 
Income is, in this sense, a social good. A certain amount of work has suggested something of 
a loss-aversion with respect to these comparisons, in that doing worse than others is more 
important in a well-being sense than doing better than others.  
Any movement in the distribution of income will therefore affect societal well-being 
both directly, via changes in individuals’ own income
s gaps between individual incomes. Imagine a rise in inequality caused by an increase 
in some top incomes. Those who benefit from higher incomes will have higher well-being, 
both because they are richer and because their gaps to others have risen (although this effect 
may only be secondary). On the contrary, those whose incomes have not risen and who 
 
11 A novel contribution in the broad area of physiological reactions to income distribution is Falk et al. (2013). 
This paper first shows in an experimental setting that perceived wage unfairness (as in unmet expectations about 
the share of a reward to be received) is associated with measured individual heart-rate variability. It is also 
shown that the answer to a question on unfair pay in the 2009 wave of the SOEP is correlated with self-reported 
health outcomes, and in particular with cardiovascular health. 
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compare to the fortunate few who are richer are now relatively worse off, which reduces their 
well-being. The overall effect is a priori ambiguous. 
Alternatively, inequality may fall due to a rise in the incomes of those at the bottom of 
the distribution (via a tick up in the minimum wage, say). Again, the well-being of those who 
benefit rises, both via greater own income and smaller gaps to the richer others. But the well-
being of those who do not benefit falls as their advantageous gaps to the poorer are now 
smaller in size. If we continue to believe that this latter effect is of second order, then we may 
expec
s towards inequality in an economy. The other main part of such 
attitudes comes from the normative view of inequality in the income distribution (as defined 
ntial amount of work devoted to the comparative 
s out to be rather more difficult to evaluate normative 
attitud
ference group, an individual evaluates the overall degree 
of income inequality in the reference group, but without making any comparisons to 
individuals who are richer or poorer than she is. Depending on the attitudes and social norms 
prevailing within a group the individual can evaluate these income disparities as fair or unfair. 
As in Section 2 above, regarding the comparative view of the reference group, there is 
evidence on the normative view of the reference group from both subjective well-being 
research and experimental analysis.  
 
t societal well-being to improve here. 
Unfortunately, most of the changes in the distribution of income that we see are this 
stylised. In order to make any kind of welfare statement, we need to know who compares to 
whom, how much the different kinds of income gaps matter, and how much relative income 
matters compared to absolute income. We have little reasonable hope of measuring these 
magnitudes with any degree of accuracy in existing data.  
Even so, we do believe that the comparative reference group exists, and represents one 
central constituent of attitude
in the Introduction). While there is a substa
reference group, it arguably turn
es towards inequality. It is to this question that we turn in Section 3 below. This section 
we will also review some of the work that has tried to disentangle the various motivations 
behind individuals’ actions. 
 
3. The normative view 
In the normative view of the re
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3.1     Inequality and well-being: What do people say? 
We are interested in this chapter, as the title suggests, in individuals' attitudes towards 
or opinions about inequality. There are a number of ways in which these can be elicited, 
including direct questioning, experimental approaches or inference from observed behaviours. 
In this sub-section, we consider the contribution of ‘happiness economics’, in which some 
measure of income inequality is related to the individual's self-reported well-being. In general, 




In this approach, we collect survey information on the subjective well-being of an 
individual i, living in some aggregate area j (where j is often, but not always, a country) at 
time t. This subjective well-being is related to a vector of standard demographic variables 
(age, sex, education, labour-force and marital statuses, and almost always the individual's or 
the household's income) through the vector β. Of most interest to us here is the conditional 
correlation (i.e. controlling for all of the variables in the vector X) between well-being and the 
aggregate measure of inequality in area j, . The estimated value of the parameter γ 
shows us whether individuals, ceteris paribus, tick up or tick down their self-reported well-
being scores in areas with higher or lower levels of income inequality.  
The estimation of an equation like (3) allows the ‘value of inequality’, as it were, to be 
inferred from the empirical relationship between the observed inequality around the individual 
and their reported level of subjective well-being. This latter is most often measured by 
questions about the individual's happiness, life and income satisfaction or some other measure 
of general psychological functioning. Multivariate regressions allow not only the sign of the 
conditional correlation between income inequality and subjective well-being to be established 
(γ above), but also the economic importance of any relationship that is identified (via the 
comparison of γ to some of the estimated β coefficients on other variables, such as income or 
unemployment).  
This ‘happiness’ approach to valuing public goods has now appeared a number of 
times in the subjective well-being literature. Some well-known pieces of work in this respect 
have considered inflation and unemployment (Di Tella et al., 2001), aircraft noise (Van Praag 
and Baarsma, 2005), and pollution (Luechinger, 2009), although there are by now many other 
applications. 
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Cross-section and panel data allow the happiness or satisfaction of tens or even 
hundreds of thousands of individuals to be measured. It is perhaps easy to get carried away by 
the sheer number of degrees of freedom here. Except that, as we suggest below, this is largely 
illusory: while it is theoretically possible for each individual to be confronted with a different 
income distribution, the most common approach has been to take cross-country data, often 
repeated cross-section, and include the country-level Gini coefficient (or something else) on 
the right-hand side of a satisfaction regression. In this case, the effective number of degrees of 
freedom in the empirical estimation remains for the most part at the two-digit level.12 
Although there are by now many thousands of empirical contributions across the 
social sciences which relate individual income to some measure of individual well-being, it 
remains true that only a small fraction of this existing work has considered any role for 
income inequality. Even so, it seems that the ease of access to large scale data sets has led to 
relatively consistent growth of research in this area over time. A necessarily incomplete but 
hopefully somewhat-representative sample of some of the work that has been carried out in 
the area of income inequality and subjective well-being appears in Table 1. This table broadly 
reflects the growth in interest in the subject, but also considerable disparity in the estimated 
value of γ, as revealed by happiness data. 
Perhaps the earliest contribution in Economics is Morawetz et al. (1977), which 
contrasts two different Israeli communities and show that the level of happiness is higher in 
the community with the more equal income distribution. Although interesting, the result 
essentially relies on two observations, and does not control for all of the other factors which 
might differ between the two communities. A contribution which is more in the regression 
framework is an innovative article by Tomes (1986). This uses data (from the 1977 Quality of 
Life Survey) on individuals in approximately 200 Federal Electoral Districts in Canada. 
Matching in census data on income distribution, it is shown that the share of income received 
by the bottom 40% of the population is negatively correlated (at the ten per cent level) with 
both satisfaction and happiness for men. The same correlations are insignificant for women. 
Inequality is thus positively correlated with men’s subjective well-being.  
Hagerty (2000) is the first of a number of contributions to use US General Social 
Survey (GSS) data. In his GSS sample from 1989 to 1996, maximum community income and 
the skew of community income are respectively negatively and positively correlated with 
                                                 
12 As one of the right-hand side variables in these kinds of regression is aggregated at a higher level than the 
dependent variable, the standard errors are under-estimated and should be corrected as in Moulton (1990): it is 
not always clear that this correction is carried out in this literature. 
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happiness scores. Hagerty also uses aggregate data from eight different countries to show that 
average happiness is lower in countries with wider income distributions. More recent work 
using the GSS has however come to a variety of results. While Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2003) and Oishi et al. (2011) both conclude that there is a negative relationship between life 
satisfaction and income inequality, Alesina et al. (2004) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) 
both find no significant relationships in GSS data. Alesina et al. (2004) is of interest here, as 
they explicitly compare long-run US and European data, from the GSS (1972-97) and 
Eurobarometer (1975-92) respectively. Over the whole sample, inequality reduces reported 
subjective well-being amongst Europeans, but not Americans. The authors suggest greater 
(perceived) social mobility in the USA as one potential explanation of this difference.  
Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) calculate inequality in gross household income at the 
region and year level in 14 waves of German SOEP data. Life satisfaction is found to be 
negatively correlated with inequality (although a measure of income redistribution is not 
significant). Other work establishing a negative correlation between inequality and well-being 
includes Biancotti and D'Alessio (2008), Brodeur and Flèche (2013), Ebert and Welsch 
(2009), Oshio and Kobayashi (2010), Verme (2011), Van de Werfhorst and Salverda (2012) 
and Winkelmann and Winkelmann (2010), using data from a wide variety of different 
countries.  
On the opposite side of the court, a number of contributions have instead concluded 
for a positive correlation. Along the same lines as the finding in Canadian data in Tomes 
(1986), Ball (2001) also finds that happiness and inequality are positively correlated in raw 
data from the 1996 World Values Survey (WVS), although the introduction of a number 
controls renders this positive correlation insignificant. The estimated value of γ in the first 
eleven waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is positive (Clark, 2003), as is 
that in the first five waves of the WVS (Rozer and Kraaykamp, 2013). Last, in one of the 
relatively rare contributions entirely outside of the OECD, Knight et al. (2009) find that 
county-level income inequality is positively correlated with happiness in the 2002 Chinese 
national household survey.  
One recent intriguing contribution to this empirical debate comes from Grosfeld and 
Senik (2010). In contrast to a number of the contributions in Table 1, their identification is 
purely within and not between country, as they consider data from Poland over its transition 
period. Using repeated CBOS cross-section data over the 1992-2005 period, they identify a 
turning point in the estimated relationship between inequality and subjective well-being. This 
correlation is positive and significant in the first years following transition, but then turns 
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negative and significant. The break point that best fits this split in the data is 1996. The 
interpretation that the authors give is in terms of inequality first being regarded as providing 
opportunities for future higher incomes, which consequently turned into more negative 
comparative evaluations of disparities as it become clearer that not everyone would be able to 
benefit from any opportunities that this greater inequality promised.  
As well as the sign and significance of the estimated effect, we are also interested in 
the size. Some of the work cited in Table 1 does contain explicit statements about marginal 
effects. For example, Tomes (1986) writes that “an increase of 10% in the share of the poor 
reduces satisfaction by approximately 0.6 of a point. In order to maintain satisfaction 
unchanged, own income would have to be increased by $4,200 for every 1% increase in the 
share of the poor” (p.435). This latter figure is larger than the annual income of 3860 
Canadian Dollars in his dataset (although it should be noted that the confidence intervals 
around these estimates are quite large). Alesina et al. (2004) find that a one percentage-point 
rise in the Gini is compensated by a rise in annual income of 2950 Dollars in the US (8.7% of 
annual income) and 474 Dollars in Europe (4.2% of annual income). The effect size in the 
SOEP in Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) seems more moderate: “If income inequality would be 
reduced by a half household income could be reduced by around 10% without changing life 
satisfaction” (p.244).  
While this kind of compensating differential is attractive in that it is easy to 
understand, it also obviously depends critically on the size of the estimated income coefficient 
in a subjective well-being equation. It is easy to believe that the coefficient on own income is 
actually an underestimate here, for standard endogeneity reasons, leading to trade-offs of 
income against inequality that are too high.  
As an alternative, we consider the well-being effect of a one-point rise in the Gini 
coefficient, with the effect size being expressed as a percentage of the range of the subjective 
well-being measure. For example, the 0 to 10 life-satisfaction scale used in the SOEP has a 
range of 10; the corresponding 1-7 scale in the BHPS has a range of 6. It is not possible to 
calculate a standardised marginal effect using this metric across all of the work in Table 1. In 
the first instance, a number of the contributions here use ordered probit or ordered logit 
estimations, so that there as many marginal effects as one minus the number of subjective 
well-being categories. Restricting ourselves to linear estimation techniques using the Gini 
which yield significant estimates cuts the sample down to five: Hagerty (2000), Schwarze and 
Härpfer (2007), Knight et al. (2009), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (2010) and Rozer and 
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Kraaykamp (2013). These papers use five different datasets, with subjective well-being 
measured on a variety of scales.  
Expressed as a percentage of the scale range, a ten percentage point change in the Gini 
coefficient mostly produces a movement in well-being of between 2% and 8% of the scale 
range (the exception being Schwarze and Härpfer, 2007, where the figure is smaller). In the 
SOEP, the standard deviation of life satisfaction is about 18% of scale range (1.79 for a scale 
of 0-10), with an analogous figure for the BHPS of 21% (1.29 for a 1-7 scale). A broad 
conclusion is that this very large movement in the Gini has an effect of between 0.1 to 0.4 of a 
standard deviation in life satisfaction. By way of comparison, the effect of unemployment on 
life satisfaction in the SOEP and the BHPS is somewhere around 6% to 10% of the scale 
range, or 0.3 to 0.5 of a life-satisfaction standard deviation.13 
Some of the work on inequality and happiness here has explored the role of mediating 
variables or sub-group regressions to establish the subjective-groups for which the correlation 
with inequality is the largest in order to shed some light on the circumstances under which 
inequality affects subjective well-being. In the perhaps absence of a clear central tendency, it 
is arguably useful for policy purposes to know where and when inequality might be harmful 
in subjective well-being terms. 
One of the best-known findings in this respect comes from Alesina et al. (2004): in 
Europe, inequality hurts the poor and left-wingers more (in the sense of having a greater 
negative effect on their well-being scores) than it does richer and right-wingers. This finding 
has recently been corroborated on more recent (2009-2010) Eurobarometer data by 
Vandendriessche (2012). Along the same lines, in Grosfeld and Senik (2010) the initial 
positive correlation between well-being and inequality was found only for right-wingers. 
Other work has considered the mediating role of individual income. Oishi et al. (2011) 
find that the effect of inequality on happiness is negative and significant only for those in the 
                                                 
13 It is arguably misleading to compare the size of the coefficient on inequality to that on individual 
unemployment. If half of the population are in the labour force, then a rise of one per cent in the unemployment 
rate corresponds to one more person out of 200 in the population being unemployed rather than employed. 
Assuming that unemployment only affects the individuals who are unemployed (so that there are no spillovers) a 
one percentage point rise in the Gini index is roughly equal to a ten percentage point rise in the unemployment 
rate. For example, consider that subjective well-being is on a 1-10 scale, and the estimated coefficient on the 
Gini is -5: this ensures that a ten percentage point rise in the Gini will lead to a fall in predicted well-being of 
0.5, which is five per cent of the scale range (the mid-point of the figures mentioned in the text). If individual 
unemployment leads to an effect on individual well-being of 8 per cent of the scale range (which is again the 
mid-point figure), then its estimated coefficient will be -0.8. A one per cent rise in the Gini reduces well-being 
by 0.05 (= 0.01 x 5). A one per cent rise in the unemployment rate will lead to a change in average well-being in 
the society by -0.8/200 = -0.004. In this calculation, assuming no spillovers from the unemployed onto the non-
unemployed, a rise in unemployment of over ten percentage points (12½ points, exactly) produces the same 
effect on societal well-being as a one percentage point rise in the Gini. 
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bottom two quintiles of the income distribution. Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) find that only 
those in the first income tercile are negatively affected by post-government income inequality. 
In Clark (2003), the correlation between regional income inequality and individual well-being 
is more positive for individuals whose own income has been more mobile over time.  
Oshio and Kobayashi (2010) carry out a number of tests of mediating variables and 
conclude that the correlation between happiness and inequality is more negative for women, 
the younger, those who have unstable positions on the labour market, and those who are 
politically in the centre (rather than being Progressive or Conservative). 
Some work has considered a mediating role for individual values, rather than observed 
demographic characteristics. In Biancotti and D’Alessio (2008), inequality has a more 
negative effect for individuals who report more inclusive and moderate values. Rozer and 
Kraaykamp (2013) find that the effect of Gini on well-being is more negative (actually less 
positive) for Europeans, those with more egalitarian norms (from a question on the relative 
preference for incomes being made more equal as opposed to needing larger income 
differences for incentive reasons), and those with greater levels of social and institutional 
trust. Last, as might be expected if the income distribution reveals information about the 
individual's own potential future position, in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Ramos (2014) the effect 
of inequality is greater for those with higher (self-reported) measures of risk aversion in 1997-
2007 SOEP data. The marginal effect of the Lander-Year Gini coefficient on life satisfaction 
is twice as negative for those with the highest risk-aversion score (on a zero to ten scale) as 
compared to the effect for those who report the modal score of five. 
One important individual value in the terms of this current chapter, and one to which 
we shall return below, is the perceived fairness of the market system (i.e. the system that 
transforms individual inputs into individual outputs). In Oishi et al. (2011), the effect of 
inequality on happiness is moderated by the individual's perceived fairness of others, and 
whether the individual believes that others can be trusted. Along the same lines, Bjørnskov et 
al. (2013) find that the perceived fairness of the income-generation process affects the 
association between income inequality and subjective well-being. 
This burgeoning work on inequality and happiness has then revealed a number of 
intriguing findings. But perhaps one of the most striking aspects of Table 1 is the sheer variety 
of empirical correlations which have been uncovered. Is there any way of making sense of the 
variety of different estimated results here, or does sample variability rule the day (with as 
many positives as negatives as zeros)? 
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A first point, apparent from the fourth column of Table 1, is that there is no empirical 
agreement on the most appropriate measure of inequality. While the majority of work refers to 
the Gini coefficient (a point to which we shall return in Section 4 below), it is also true that no 
consensus has been reached regarding the geographic level at which this coefficient should be 
evaluated.  
Most of the empirical analysis has been carried out using data which contains only 
coarse-grained information on the distribution of income (i.e. at a very aggregated level, such 
as the country). Some work on British, Japanese, German and Russian data has appealed to 
measures of inequality at the regional level (respectively: Clark 2003, Oshio and Kobayashi, 
2010, Schwarze and Härpfer, 2007, and Senik, 2004). One of the few contributions to use 
large-scale data with more local-level inequality measures is Brodeur and Flèche (2013), who 
appeal to county-level information in the American BRFSS. Another is Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann (2010), who match in measures of inequality at all of the (in increasing order of 
size) municipality, region and canton levels in the 2002 wave of the Swiss Household Panel. 
The research in Knight et al. (2009) combines more local-level measures of the distribution of 
income with data from a non-OECD country (China), finding a positive effect of the county-
level Gini on respondents' happiness (see also Jiang et al., 2012). 
One of the reasons why the degree of aggregation matters is that the Gini often moves 
only little over time, a point made by Graham and Felton (2006), who note that the Gini 
coefficient in Chile in the 2000s is not substantially different from that which pertained in the 
1960s, despite the considerable social and economic changes that have taken place over the 
intervening period. Econometrically, it is then difficult to introduce both the Gini and country 
dummies into a regression, leading to the possibility that the Gini may be proxying for some 
other fixed country characteristic that is correlated with subjective well-being.  
In general, this lack of variation in the measure of inequality does not help us to 
assuage the doubt that it is strongly correlated with some other variable that is important for 
happiness. For example, income inequality at the regional or country level may well reflect 
industrial structure or the unemployment rate, both of which may well have independent 
effects on subjective well-being. Given a sufficient number of observations, it should be 
possible to tease out the independent contributions of inequality and other variables. But at the 
aggregate level it is anything but sure that sufficient observations are available. In general, the 
list of potentially-important aggregate-level variables is often perilously close to the number 
of degrees of freedom in the analysis. In Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008), for example, 
income inequality attracts a negative but insignificant coefficient in their analysis of 
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Eurobarometer and GSS data. They note that this occurs “in part because there is some 
degree of co-linearity between the included variables. For example, if we do not include 
unemployment benefits, a variable that is highly correlated with inequality, we find that the 
coefficient on inequality becomes negative and significant” (p.36). Verme (2011) concurs that 
the lack of variability in survey measures of the Gini coefficient make it particularly 
susceptible to multicollinearity with other aggregate-level variables (a problem he tackles via 
a number of robustness tests in which the other aggregate explanatory variables are dropped 
in turn). 
An additional drawback to the empirical analysis of the relationship between 
individual well-being and aggregate income inequality is that it does not adequately 
distinguish between the comparative and normative aspects of the reference group. Even 
though some of the empirical analyses in Table 1 (although far from all) do introduce some 
measure of the mean of the income distribution into the analysis, they are unable almost by 
construction to calculate measures of relative deprivation and relative satisfaction from the 
survey data used. As such, any partial correlation between aggregate income inequality and 
individual subjective well-being very likely mixes together aspects of the comparative and 
normative reference groups, which perhaps explains the variety of estimated coefficients in 
Table 1.  
Given the perhaps natural limits on the analysis of the relationship between aggregate 
inequality and individual subjective well-being, any evidence from this type of analysis will 
probably have to remain suggestive. This is arguably not the case for experimental work, 
where the reference group and the degree of inequality can be exactly manipulated, and it is to 
this that we now turn. Experimental work is of course not free of problems, in that what 
people say in a controlled setting may well differ from what the way in which they would 
actually behave in reality, and their perceptions of inequality will likely be influenced by 
many factors. For a thorough discussion of these aspects and problems with experiments 
regarding social preferences, see Levitt and List (2007). 
 
3.2      Experimental economics 
The experimental economics contributions to inequality aversion from the more 
aggregate perspective have appealed to two different approaches: 1) inequality and risk 
aversion with a parametric social welfare function; and 2) general social welfare functions. In 
the first of these, two types of experiments have been run. The first is similar to that adopted 
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in the experiments on status or relative income discussed above in Section 2.2, that is the 
choice between alternative societies with different income distributions behind the veil of 
ignorance. The second type is based on the leaky-bucket experiment, which we introduce 
below. 
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) carry out hypothetical-choice experiments. An 
individual’s relative risk aversion is interpreted as the social inequality aversion from a 
utilitarian social welfare function’s perspective. Inequality aversion is evaluated via 
individuals’ choices between two types of society, from behind a veil of ignorance. 
Individuals are asked to choose the society that would be the best in terms of the well-being of 
their imaginary grandchild (in order for choices to be abstracted from the respondent’s own 
circumstances and environment). The income distributions in the two societies, A and B, are 
uniform, and the respondent is told that their grandchild has an equal probability of receiving 
any income level within the range.  
For example, Society A has a uniform income range of 10,000 to 50,000 Swedish 
kroner, whereas Society B has a uniform income range of 19,400 to 38,800 Swedish kroner. 
The student subjects in the experiment are told that prices are the same in the two societies, 
that there is no welfare state, and that there are no growth effects of the different income 
distributions.  
An individual who is risk neutral will prefer Society A, in which expected income is 
higher. Someone who is indifferent between the two societies will have a relative risk-
aversion parameter, η, that can be calculated by assuming a CRRA utility function14 (see their 
equation (5)). In the example given above, indifference between societies A and B implies a 
value of η of 0.5; equally, an individual who prefers A (B) over B (A) will have a value of η 
of < (>) 0.5. There are eight different conditions in their experiment. Society A always 
remains as described above, while there are eight society B's, ordered such that indifference 
between A and B implies increasing risk aversion (see their Table 1). The higher is the value 
of η, the more income society is willing to give up in order to bring about a more egalitarian 
distribution of income, corresponding to a more concave social-welfare function.  
The median value of inequality aversion in these experiments is in the interval between 
two and three. The respondents were fairly evenly-distributed between the categories, with 
43% of the respondents having inequality aversion of between one and five. Furthermore, a 
considerable number of respondents (17%) exhibited zero or negative inequality aversion. In 
                                                 
14 Such that U = y1-η/(1-η) if η ≠ 1, and U = ln(y) if η = 1. 
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addition, 19% of respondents exhibited extreme aversion compatible with the Rawlsian maxi-
min strategy, which is the case of maximum aversion in the experiment. In a similar 
experimental setting, Carlsson et al. (2005) confirm a median value of relative risk aversion 
of between two and three, and find a larger fraction of respondents (63%) with a value of 
relative risk aversion between one and five. In their experiment, 8% of respondents were 
found to be risk-lovers.15 
Some work in this area has tried to distinguish further between two types of inequality 
aversion: the first is the individual’s level of risk aversion, as explained above, while the 
second is the individual willingness to pay to live in a more equal society. The estimation of 
individual inequality aversion only via risk aversion disregards any preferences that 
individuals may have regarding inequality per se.  
To separate out these two attitudes, two types of experiments are carried out, one for 
each type of aversion. To this end, Carlsson et al. (2005) extend the analysis of Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2002). The first experiment concerns the traditional imaginary grandchild, as 
described above, where the respondents do not know the position of their grandchildren, but 
only the income distribution and hence also the probability distribution in each society. In the 
second experiment, subjects choose between pairs of hypothetical societies with different 
income distributions, where the grandchild’s income is known and is set equal to the mean 
income in the society. In other words, “In the first experiment individuals choose between 
hypothetical lotteries, where the outcomes determine their grandchildren’s incomes in a given 
society. This experiment allows for the estimation of the individual’s risk aversion in a setting 
where the level of social inequality is fixed. In the second experiment individuals choose 
between hypothetical societies with different income distributions, where the grandchildren’s 
incomes are known and are always equal to the mean income in each society. This experiment 
enables us to estimate parameters of individual inequality aversion in a risk-free setting” 
(Carlsson et al., 2005, p.376). 
In the second experiment, with a value of inequality aversion of zero the individual is 
indifferent to income inequality; with a value of one, a 1% increase in own income yields as 
much utility as does a 1% fall in inequality. The median value of inequality aversion is found 
to be in the interval between 0.09 and 0.22, and most responses reflect positive inequality 
aversion. Only 7% of respondents appear to be inequality-lovers, in the sense that they are 
                                                 
15 It is notable that the values of the degree of inequality-aversion found in this experimental literature are far 
higher than those used in practice for the measurement of inequality: The US Census Bureau uses a value of less 
than 1 (see http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p60-204.pdf), whereas the key inequality measures reported 
on the Luxemburg Income Study website as their “key figures” only use values of 0.5 and 1. 
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willing to sacrifice their own income in order to make society more unequal, while 6% are 
found to be extremely inequality-averse. Kroll and Davidovitz (2003) also find that subjects 
prefer more equal income distributions. However, when they had to give up part of their 
reward in order to shift to a more equal distribution, they chose not to do so. 
Amiel et al. (1999) belongs to the second type of experiment in method 1), in which 
social inequality aversion is estimated via the leaky-bucket experiment. A sample of students 
were asked to indicate the amount of ‘lost money’ that they were willing to accept for a 
transfer of money from a richer to a poorer individual, where this loss came about for example 
due to administrative costs. The median value of inequality aversion was estimated to be 
between 0.1 and 0.22, which is much lower than the existing estimates from the alternative 
approach, such as in Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002). However, the circumstances of the two 
experiments are very different, making a clear comparison of the results rather difficult.  
That these large differences in the value of inequality aversion result from the different 
measurement techniques is confirmed by Pirttilä et al. (2008). The authors estimate inequality 
aversion using a questionnaire approach in a representative survey of Finns. The advantage of 
this questionnaire is that the same individual was asked questions based on two different 
measurement techniques: the leaky bucket and the preferred wage distribution under the veil 
of ignorance. The median value of the inequality aversion parameter from the leaky-bucket 
questions lay below 0.5. However, the results from the preferred distribution question gave a 
much higher value for inequality aversion, with the parameter being over 3. There are thus a 
considerable number of respondents who are willing to sacrifice the mean wage in order to 
bring about a more equal distribution of wages, but who at the same time are not willing to 
carry out costly transfers from richer to poorer.  
Pirttilä et al. propose a number of explanations for this rather radical difference in the 
results. One possibility is that people simply have different attitudes towards the implied 
efficiency–equity trade off in different situations. The leaky-bucket question is specifically 
focussed on redistribution, whereas the change in the wage distribution is a bargaining result. 
The two questions may also be measuring the same phenomenon but at a different scale. In 
addition, the leakage, that is the efficiency loss, is explicitly visible in the leaky bucket 
question, whereas the respondent would have to calculate it in the wage-distribution question. 
Respondents may have had efficiency concerns in mind in the leaky-bucket question, and 
their preferences over efficiency could explain part of their unwillingness to support the 
transfer.  
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Pirttilä et al. also confirm the results in Beckman et al. (2004): the actual position of the 
respondent in the income distribution affects the answer given in the leaky bucket experiment. 
As expected, support for this transfer is higher amongst the individuals who would benefit 
from it. 
In the income-distribution literature the indices that are deemed appropriate to measure 
inequality are those which conform to the Lorenz dominance criterion. These indices fulfil 
four basic axioms: scale invariance, symmetry, the population principle and the Pigou-Dalton 
transfer principle. For a recent survey of these properties and the dominance criteria see, 
amongst others, the excellent chapter in Chakravarty (2009). The first three properties are 
commonly assumed in the majority of indices of well-being; only the transfer principle, as we 
mentioned in the introduction, is at the heart of inequality measurement. 
Attitudes towards inequality have been interpreted by some authors as being revealed by 
the reaction of (some relatively informed part of) the general public to these four basic 
properties. This is the contribution of the authors in group 2), where some general social 
welfare function is assumed but without any a priori functional form. The main question that 
is addressed in this part of the literature is what inequality seems to represent for the general 
public, and in particular whether these four basic axioms are reflected in individuals’ views. 
The seminal book is this area is Amiel and Cowell (1999). Given that the defining concept for 
inequality measurement is the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, we below discuss only those 
experimental results which cover this aspect of inequality.  
In Amiel and Cowell (1992), the transfer principle is presented to respondents both as a 
numerical problem and verbally. In the former, the are asked to say which of two distributions 
of income are more unequal: A=(l, 4, 7, 10, 13) vs. B=(l, 5, 6, 10, 13). 
Verbally, they are asked to say what happens to inequality in the following scenario: 
“Suppose we transfer income from a person who has more income to a person who has less, 
without changing anyone else’s income. After the transfer the person who formerly has more 
still has more”.  
Nearly two-thirds of the student sample in Amiel and Cowell (1992) do not think that 
inequality is lower in A than in B above, while 40% do not agree that inequality will fall 
following the verbal scenario. The difference in these figures likely comes from individuals 
thinking of some kind of Robin Hood redistribution in the verbal case, whereas the actual 
numerical problem involves redistribution from the fairly poor to the even poorer. Amiel et al. 
(2012) examine many ‘flavours’ or interpretations of the transfer problem. Only 21.6% of the 
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sample are found to be in line with the researcher’s standard view. A critique of the way in 
which some of these kinds of questions are asked is provided by Jancewicz (2012).16 
Similarly to Kroll and Davidovitz (2003) and Carlsson et al. (2005), Amiel and Cowell 
(2002), Gaertner and Namazie (2003) and Cowell and Cruces (2004), using method 2), 
examine the degree to which the principle of transfers is followed by people who evaluate 
inequality and risk. About 60% of respondents in the latter contribution viewed an equalising 
transfer as inequality/risk reducing, and consistency in the risk version of the questionnaire 
was higher than consistency with the principle of transfers in the inequality version. This 
finding is confirmed by Gaertner and Namazie and Amiel and Cowell (2002), where the 
proportions of acceptance in the sample are 23% in the risk questionnaire and 17% for 
inequality. 
Overall, individuals do have normative preferences over the distribution of income. It is 
however hard to argue that these are isolated in happiness regressions, as the latter are not 
able to separate out the comparative and normative components of attitudes to inequality. The 
experimental literature has been more successful in this respect, but even there the variety of 
different methods have produced quite a large range for the estimated value of inequality-
aversion. Part of the problem here seems to be that the different methods make salient 
different preferences (such as risk aversion or preferences over efficiency). Another is that 
there are almost an infinite number of ways in which we can change the inequality of the 
income distribution, and preferences over taking money from the rich to give to the poor, and 
taking money from the middle or lower-middle class to give the poor may reasonably differ, 
even if the final impact on the Gini coefficient is the same.  
 
4. Outstanding issues  
 
This section discusses a number of issues which extend the existing literature on income 
gaps and income inequality described above. 
 
4.1    Inequality and other outcome variables 
The discussion to date has considered individuals’ relationship to others’ incomes 
purely in the sense of ‘do they like it or not’, whether that be revealed by survey information 
                                                 
16 For example, the lack of a “Don’t Know” response category, and there being no natural unit of account given 
for the figures in the numerical problem. 
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on subjective well-being or behaviour in experiments. At the risk of opening a Pandora’s Box 
of other possible dependent variables, this is far from being the only outcome of interest. A 
number of other possible outcomes have been investigated across the social sciences: the 
following is a brief sample of some recent areas of research in this respect.  
de Vries et al. (2011) test the hypothesis that income inequality may produce 
individuals who are more competitive and less friendly towards others. These latter attitudes 
are captured by the Big Five personality factor of Agreeableness, which now appears in a 
number of surveys.17 The regression analysis in de Vries et al. (2011) is based on almost 700 
000 observations between 2001 and 2009 from an American web-based survey aimed at 
measuring personality. Agreeableness scores are significantly negatively correlated with 
State-level income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient on pre-tax household 
income matched in from the 2000 Census). This individual-level personality finding can be 
argued to be consistent with the considerable amount of existing evidence on aggregate 
inequality and measures of violent behaviour: see Daly et al. (2001) for evidence on Canadian 
provincial-level murder rates, and Macours (2011) for the role of district-level income 
inequality (over a period of income growth) in fuelling civil conflict (as measured by mass 
abductions by Maoist rebels) in Nepal.  
Loughnan et al. (2011) analyse self-enhancement, which is the propensity to see 
yourself as being better than the average. They consider the relationship between self-
enhancement and income inequality, with the argument that the gain from being better than 
others will be larger in more unequal societies. They administer a self-enhancement 
questionnaire to (mainly student) samples across 15 countries. In these questionnaires, 
respondents are asked about 20 different desirable characteristics. For each characteristic, they 
say whether they have more, the same, or less of it than the average student (or average 
person, in the non-student samples). They first show that respondents on average think they 
have more of the characteristic than the average in 14 out of 15 countries (the exception is 
Japan). They further demonstrate that self-enhancement is greater in countries with a higher 
Gini coefficient. This relationship is resistant to the introduction of a range of individual-level 
psychological variables. 
In DeBruine et al. (2011), data from almost 5000 women aged 16-40 across 30 
developed countries shows that women’s preferences for facial masculinity are negatively 
correlated with a composite measure of country health: the value of masculinity as a proxy for 
                                                 
17 As measured by the answers to questions on being interested in people, taking time out for others, and not 
being interested in other people’s problems (this latter being reverse-coded).  
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developmental health is greater in countries where health is on average worse. Brooks et al. 
(2011) build on this work by noting that facial masculinity may also matter via the spread of 
the benefits which it confers. In the same way that a greater dollar return to higher rank in a 
golf tournament seems to lead to greater effort by players (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990), 
any signal predicting competitive success is more valuable when rewards are more spread out. 
They hence match in data on the national Gini coefficient (from the United Nations Statistics 
Division) to DeBruine et al.'s original preference data. Their subsequent empirical analysis 
suggests that suggests that national income inequality is a better predictor of female 
preferences for facial masculinity than is national health.  
Van de Werfhorst and Salverda (2012), in their introduction to a special issue of 
Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, suggest that income inequality at the national 
level is associated with a number of observable and attitudinal outcome variables. A number 
of the papers contained in this special issue go on to examine in detail the negative 
relationships between income inequality, on the one hand, and all of solidarity towards others, 
expressed support for democracy, and actual political participation. 
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) simultaneously estimate a measure of generalised trust 
and income inequality (the Gini coefficient). They conclude that inequality does indeed 
significantly diminish trust, while the estimated coefficient on trust in the income inequality 
equation is negative but insignificant. These findings have recently been critically re-
evaluated by Steijn and Lancee (2011), who specifically underline the potential importance of 
non-Western countries with particularly high levels of income inequality, and a confounding 
role of national wealth. Their regressions on Western country data (from the International 
Social Survey Programme, ISSP, and European Social Survey, ESS) show that the bivariate 
correlation between income inequality and trust is negative and significant, but that this 
relationship becomes insignificant in multivariate analysis once wealth is controlled for. 
We are not necessarily arguing here that these additional potential attitudinal18 
correlates of income inequality are to be considered separately and in isolation. Rather we 
think that they indeed represent some of the channels via which income inequality leads 
through to overall well-being outcomes (and to those regarding individual health, on which 
there is a substantial literature that we have not covered here: see Chapter 18). 
 
                                                 
18 Moving beyond the individual level, we can also consider the attitudes expressed by other societal actors. 
Burgoon (2013) analyses party position-taking in almost fifty years of annual data across 22 different countries. 
Net income inequality is positively and significantly associated with anti-globalization position-taking. 
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4.2    Other measures of different aspects of the distribution of income  
All of our discussion of attitudes towards the distribution of income has been in terms of 
gaps to others in the reference group, in Section 2, and a normalised sum of all the gaps in 
society, as the Gini coefficient in Section 3. We have presumed that these are indeed the 
salient measures of others' income. But we do not know that for sure.19  
Consider two log-normal distributions of income, where one is a horizontal 
displacement of the other, as in Figure 1. Which is the most unequal? If we are not in the 
income distribution then our (normative) evaluation of the dispersion in these two curves 
depends on which distribution measure we choose. Some measures of various aspects of the 
distribution of income are identical across the two: this is the case for the absolute Gini 
coefficient, the variance, the interquartile range and the percentage of the population in 
relative poverty (as defined as income below 60% of the median, say). Other measures are not 
the same in distributions 1 and 2: the percentage in absolute poverty, the relative Gini 
coefficient and the D9/D1 or D5/D1 ratios.  
If the individual making the evaluation is in the income distribution, then their 
evaluation will also depend on their own income position: this is the comparative evaluation. 
At an income of Yi, an individual will feel more deprived in distribution 2 than in distribution 
1: their relative deprivation will be higher (more people above them) and their satisfaction 
will be lower (fewer people beneath them).  
We have considered the relationship between objective measures of inequality, such as 
the Gini, and subjective well-being. But do people actually know what the value of the 
regional or national Gini coefficient is? Individuals’ perceptions of the degree of inequality 
around them may not be well reflected in the Gini coefficient, and equally they may believe 
the distribution of income to be different from what is actually measured in statistics.  
Macunovich (2011) is an intriguing contribution using the fourth (2005) wave of the 
WVS. She analyses not only the Gini coefficient, but also two measures of crowding at the 
bottom of the distribution: the ratio of the number of people who say that they are in the 
lowest income decile in the country to the number who say that they are in the highest, and 
the same ratio with respect to self-reported social class. While the Gini coefficient continues 
to exhibit a positive correlation with both happiness and life satisfaction, the estimated 
                                                 
19 A question which we do not address here is whether it is the pre-tax or post-tax income distribution that is 
correlated with subjective well-being. One reading is that it is the distribution of pre-tax income which 
determines both well-being and preferences for redistribution, and this latter influences the actual tax system 
which in turn determines the post-tax distribution of income. At the practical level, not all empirical papers make 
clear whether their income measures are net or gross.  
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coefficients on these two ratios are negative and often significant. This might be thought of as 
consistent with some of those at the bottom providing a negative signal (as in D’Ambrosio 
and Frick, 2012), or more generally with some negative externalities in society associated 
with poverty. 
O'Connell (2004) uses information on (the log of) the income received by the top 
quintile in a country to that received by the bottom quintile. This is shown to be negatively 
associated with life satisfaction in an aggregate-level analysis of 15 EU countries in 
Eurobarometer data over the 1995-1998 period.  
Some of the work appearing in Table 1 uses a variety of measures of income 
distributions. Both Tomes (1986) and Brodeur and Flèche (2013) consider the bottom end of 
the distribution, with the former including the share of income earned by the bottom 40%, and 
the latter the county-level percentage in poverty according to three separate definitions.  
In general, however, very few contributions here have tested different measures against 
each other in a beauty contest to see which one is the most salient correlate of subjective well-
being. Ebert and Welsch (2009) is relatively unusual in this literature in that they do consider 
a wide class of inequality indices comprising the Atkinson and Gini family as special 
subclasses (see Ebert, 1988), and evaluate their effects on individual reported life satisfaction 
in 20 years of Eurobarometer data. As the self-reported income data in the Eurobarometer is 
not sufficiently good to allow detailed measures to be computed from within the dataset, these 
latter are matched in from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which somewhat reduces the 
number of countries which can be used in the empirical analysis.  
Ebert and Welsch start by considering the Gini, Atkinson 0.5 and Atkinson 1.0 indices. 
All three of these are shown to be significantly correlated with life satisfaction in ordered 
probit regressions. They then consider generalizations of these indices. Their analysis of life 
satisfaction leads them to conclude that both rank and level inequality aversion matter, and 
that the overall degree of inequality aversion is larger than that implied by the standard 
measures applied in empirical analysis.20 
A last point with respect to the question of ‘which measure of others’ income’ is that 
existing work has very much concentrated on cardinal measures of comparisons, as picked up 
by income gaps and Gini coefficients. While there is likely some role for such comparisons, it 
also seems probable that individuals are rank-sensitive. Some previous work has considered 
the role of income rank in determining well-being. In Brown et al. (2008), income rank is 
                                                 
20 It would also be of great interest to evaluate the relationship between income polarization and individuals’ 
reports of subjective well-being. We are not aware of any contributions in this respect.  
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shown to outperform average reference group income in three satisfaction equations 
(influence over the job, achievement, and supervisor’s respect): see also Clark et al. (2009a) 
for economic satisfaction and Boyce et al. (2010) for life satisfaction. In the field experiment 
in Card et al. (2012), information on the individual’s revealed rank in the income distribution 
was more important in determining their satisfaction than was the relative wage level. Clark et 
al. (2010) appeal to both survey and experimental evidence on the role of relative income in 
determining the level of effort that workers supply. In both types of data, the individual’s rank 
in the income distribution is a more powerful determinant of their effort decision (as 
measured by the log-likelihood) than is the relation of the individual’s own income to mean 
income in the reference group. Mujcic and Frijters (2013) come to the same conclusion in the 
analysis of hypothetical choice data from a sample of just over 1000 Australian students. 
Finally, Clark and Senik (2014) appeal to Chinese panel data from Guizhou province, in 
which all households in the village are interviewed. This complete data allows household rank 
in the village income distribution to be determined. Being at the top (top decile) or bottom 
(lowest 25%) of the income distribution seems to matter disproportionately for satisfaction 
with income. 
It may also be the case that not all ranks are of equal importance, so that the correlation 
between income rank and subjective well-being is non-linear. The experimental and survey 
results in Kuziemko et al. (2014) underline the importance of the aversion to being last in the 
distribution. Experimental subjects accept gambles which may move them out of last place 
that they reject if anywhere else in the distribution. Equally, subjects randomly placed in 
second-to-last place in modified-dictator games are the most likely to give money to the 
person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below. One implication is that the 
relatively poor may oppose redistribution if it is especially targeted at those who are just 
beneath them in the income distribution. Survey data does indeed show that respondents who 
earn just above the minimum wage are those who are the most likely to oppose any rise in the 
minimum wage. 
These kinds of rank comparisons are of great interest. They do imply a role for 
inequality in the determination of individual well-being in that, given own income, a mean-
preserving spread of income in the reference group implies lower individual rank. However, 
at the societal level this will not matter. By construction, rank is zero-sum: my loss must be 
offset by others’ gains. Unless we have heterogeneity in the taste for rank (as in Frank, 1985), 
the degree of inequality will here not affect the way in which income comparisons affect 
overall well-being.  
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 4.3    Fairness and preferences for redistribution 
The measures of income distribution used in the above literature have been objective: 
they measure what others in the society actually earn. This is of course not necessarily what 
individuals believe that others earn, and it may well be this latter, and its relation to what it is 
believed that others should earn, that is the most important for determining individual 
attitudes towards inequality.  
Almost no-one in our societies thinks that everyone should receive the same income. 
Incomes differ often for very good reasons, such as number of hours of work for example. In 
general, we can think of the causes of income distribution as being partitioned into factors for 
which the individual is responsible and those for which she is not (see Fleurbaey, 1995). 
These are respectively referred to as effort and circumstances in the literature on the equality 
of opportunity (see Roemer and Trannoy, 2014, for a survey in great detail).21 Almås et al. 
(2011) propose the measurement of a ‘responsibility-sensitive’ fair income distribution. This 
is applied to 1986-2005 Norwegian data. They show that, although the Gini index fell over 
this period, unfair income inequality actually rose. Further, the pre-tax unfair income Gini 
rose less than the post-tax unfair income Gini, so that the tax system has become less pro-fair. 
An alternative approach to fairness, which does not require the explicit distinction of 
responsibility and non-responsibility factors, is to explicitly ask individuals about how much 
they think that others should earn. For example, the cross-country ISSP surveys have asked 
direct questions a number of times about perceived and fair distributions of incomes. Each 
year the ISSP survey administers a number of core questions, as well as rotating modules on 
specific topics. These modules in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009 were on Social Inequality. 
Individuals were asked directly how much they thought that individuals in certain job types 
earned. For example, in the 1987 wave, variable v26 refers to the answer to the following 
question: 
“We would like to know what you think people in these jobs actually earn. Please write 
in how much you think they usually earn each year, before taxes. (Many people are not 
exactly sure about this, but your best guess will be close enough. This may be difficult, but it 
is important, so please try.). First, about how much do you think a bricklayer earns?”. 
                                                 
21 We might expect inequality to be less acceptable when it occurs by chance, rather than from individual effort. 
In this context, it is noticeable that there is no particular push to redistribute from lottery winners. This may 
reflect that they on average already pay a tax by spending more on the lottery than they receive. In the UK 
National Lottery, for example, less than half of the money spent on tickets is won in prizes. 
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Variable v27 refers to the answer to the same question, but now with respect to a Doctor in 
general practice. The following nine questions then cover the income of a bank clerk, an 
owner of a small shop, the chairman of a large national company, a skilled worker in a 
factory, a farm worker, a secretary, a city bus driver, an unskilled factory worker, and a 
cabinet minister in a national government.  
Last, individuals are asked a series of eleven questions covering the same occupations, 
but this time are asked to indicate what they think that they think that these individuals should 
earn each year before taxes, regardless of what they do actually receive. 
The same types of questions are repeated across the different Social Inequality modules, 
although by 2009 the questions only covered the five occupations of a Doctor in general 
practice, the chairman of a large national company, a shop assistant, an unskilled factory 
worker, and a cabinet minister in a national government. 
Similar kinds of questions have appeared in a number of other surveys, including the 
2005 wave of the SOEP. It is also possible to ask these questions about actual and just 
rewards with respect to the individual herself, or regarding a hypothetical third person with a 
given set of demographic characteristics (see Jasso, 2007).  
One application of the answers to these questions is to consider the responses that are 
given for occupations at the top and bottom end of the income distribution: for example, in the 
above ISSP questions, the incomes of the chairman of a large national company and an 
unskilled factory worker. The ratio of these two gives an indication of the income inequality 
that the respondent perceives. Along the same lines, a fairness index can be calculated as the 
ratio of the incomes that the individual believes that these two occupations should earn. The 
comparison of these two ratios gives an indication of how much of the gap in earnings that the 
individual perceives is considered to be fair.  
An empirical application of this kind of approach can be found in Schneider (2012), 
who uses German data from the 2006 wave of International Social Justice Project to consider 
the relationship between subjective well-being and income inequality. Instead of calculating a 
Gini coefficient from within the dataset, or matching it in at some level from an external data 
source, she calculates a direct measure of the individual's perception of the fairness of the 
income distribution. 
Using the responses to the questions about the perceived incomes (PI) and just incomes 
(JI) of a managing director (MD) and an unskilled worker, she calculates a measure of the 
overall legitimacy of income inequality as follows: 
 47
Legitimate Inequality = ln[(PIMD/PIunskilled)/(JIMD/JIunskilled)]. 
 
Someone who believes that the current income distribution is just has a value of 
legitimate inequality of zero. Those who believe that the income gaps should be wider will 
have a negative value, while those who perceive some inequality of reward will have a 
positive value. This measure of legitimate inequality varies at the individual level, therefore 
providing far more potential explanatory power than the aggregate-level measures of income 
inequality which have been discussed so far.22  
In her 2006 data, Schneider reports an average value of the first term in the square 
brackets, PIMD/PIunskilled of around 644, with the average value of JIMD/JIunskilled being slightly 
over 300. This yields a value of legitimate inequality of around 0.75. The individual level of 
the perception of inequality is shown to be negatively correlated with life satisfaction. This 
correlation is stronger for the higher than for the lower income groups.  
Osberg and Smeeding (2006) appeal to these questions in the 1999 ISSP survey. 
However, instead of looking at the gaps with respect to the top and bottom occupations in the 
list, they consider the entire set of responses regarding perceived and just incomes. By 
assuming that there are equal numbers of individuals in each of the nine occupations, they can 
calculate Gini coefficients, both with respect to the income that the individual actually 
believes is earned, and a ‘just’ Gini coefficient for the income that she believes should pertain. 
They then calculate the ratio of these two Gini coefficients: a value of less than one implies 
that the individual believes that there should be less inequality than that which she believes 
exists.23 
Most people are in favour of some levelling of incomes, while very few believe that all 
incomes should be the same. The average value of the ratio of the Gini coefficients is less 
than one in all of the 27 countries which appear in the 1999 ISSP. The average figure across 
all countries is 0.75. In some countries, such as the US and Japan, this figure is around 0.8; in 
others such as Spain and Sweden it is under 0.7. As well as cross-country differences in this 
measure of the desire to redistribute, there are systematic differences by individual 
                                                 
22 Legitimate inequality does differ across individuals, which is good. However, it is also potentially 
endogenous, with unhappy people thinking that people at the top of the income distribution earn more (or should 
earn less), for example. 
23 Blanchflower and Freeman (1997) are along the same lines. They use the 1987 and 1992 ISSP surveys and 
consider the standard deviation of the log response given across the different occupations. They do this both for 
the perceived and fair distributions (which they call the perceived and appropriate differentials). Their main 
result is that ex-Communist countries both perceive and consider appropriate tighter income distributions 
compared to Western countries, but that this gap fell sharply over the transition process (here between 1987 and 
1992).  
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characteristics as well. In particular, Osberg and Smeeding underline the importance of age, 
education and family income in this respect. 
A more direct approach to perceived income inequality, and its relation to subjective 
well-being, is taken by Smyth and Qian (2008), who use Chinese data from a 2002 survey of 
31 cities. In this data, individuals are asked directly about their perceptions of inequality of 
the income distribution, on a one to five ordered scale. These perceptions are shown to be 
correlated with individual happiness scores.24 The sign of this correlation depends on the 
individual’s own position in the income distribution. In particular, perceived inequality is 
negatively correlated with happiness for individuals who are in the bottom quintile of the 
income distribution, whereas this correlation is positive for those who are in the top quintile. 
The importance of inputs and income inequality has also appeared in the experimental 
literature: it matters where income comes from. Abeler et al. (2010) find, in a gift-exchange 
game, that equal wages lead to systematically lower levels of effort being furnished by 
workers than when the firm can decide to pay workers differently. Their explanation is that 
workers do not want their wage-effort ratio to be lower than that of their co-workers, and 
consequently work less hard. Clark et al. (2010) also find that the wages offered to other 
experimental participants in a gift-exchange game are negatively correlated with the effort 
furnished by the worker. Krawczyk (2010) finds in experimental work that the equality of 
opportunity moderates the desire to redistribute. 
Perhaps the most direct evidence of attitudes towards inequality comes from asking 
individuals whether they want to see less of it, by redistributing from the richer to the poorer. 
There is a considerable literature on the desire to redistribute: see Förster and Tóth (2014). 
One of the first contributions is Persson and Tabellini (1994), who both propose a theoretical 
model and present some empirical results with respect to the median-voter theorem. The 
individuals here are purely concerned with their own self-interest, and have no social 
preferences as such. The median here refers to the distribution of some variable, for example 
income or skills (as measured by education). The individual’s voting preferences will then 
depend on their own position in that distribution.  
A second well-known contribution is Piketty (1995), who develops a theoretical model 
to explain why, in the long run, Left-wing dynasties in the lower class are more supportive of 
                                                 
24 This correlation is arguably large in size. Happiness in their survey is on a 1-5 scale, as is the individual’s 
perception of inequality. The overall partial correlation between happiness and fairness in their Table 2 is -0.09. 
As such, the effect of moving from the bottom to the top of the perceived income inequality scale has an effect 
of 0.36, which is 9% of the scale range. We cannot directly compare this figure to the correlation between 
subjective well-being and the Gini coefficient in Section 3.1, as we cannot map the seriousness of inequality to a 
particular Gini figure. 
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redistributive policies, while Right-wing dynasties in the upper-middle classes are less so. As 
in Persson and Tabellini (1994), individual income is here related to political opinion: those 
with higher incomes are more right-wing and less favorable to redistributive policies, while 
those with lower incomes are more likely to vote for left-wing parties and to be in favor of 
redistribution.25 
It is not only the individual’s situation today that counts, but also where she thinks that 
she might end up tomorrow. The ‘prospect of upward mobility’ (POUM) literature explicitly 
appeals to individuals’ future prospects of social mobility. As such, own current income is not 
a sufficient statistic to know the individual’s current preferences over redistribution. The 
currently poor may oppose redistribution if they expect their own income to improve in the 
future (Benabou and Ok, 1996, provide theoretical and empirical evidence that the POUM 
hypothesis works to limit the extent of redistribution in democracies). There is an obvious 
parallel between the POUM hypothesis and what we referred to as the signal effect of others’ 
incomes in Section 2.1.  
A number of pieces of empirical work have correspondingly underlined the importance 
of both current and future income. Along these lines, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), using 
Russian microdata, were the first to show that self-assessed expected own social mobility, or 
the belief of being on a rising income trajectory, leads to lower demand for redistribution. 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show that preferences for redistribution are sensitive to the 
objectively-measured future gains and losses that would result from it (again, this is consistent 
with pure self-interest). They also stress the importance of mobility as an objective measure of 
the future expected gains and losses resulting from redistribution. In particular, there is a 
negative relationship between upward mobility (defined as the individual’s own job prestige 
being higher than that of their father) and preferences for redistribution.26 In particular, a 
subjective measure of whether the respondent says that he and his family ‘have a good chance 
of improving their standard of living’ is very strongly negatively correlated with support for 
redistribution. Cojocaru (2014b) analyses data from the second wave of the LiTS survey (the 
data are from 2010), and shows that preferences for redistribution are indeed linked to future 
upward mobility. The demand for redistribution is lower amongst those who are poor today 
                                                 
25 There is also a lively literature which emphasizes not necessarily whether I myself will benefit from 
redistribution, but also whether “people like me” are likely to do so. A recent survey of ethnic diversity and 
preferences for redistribution is provided by Stichnoth and Van der Straeten (2013). 
26 The survey in Alesina and Giuliano (2010) emphasises the role of the past in general, both the individual’s 
own past and the country’s history. 
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but expect to be rich27 in four years’ time than for those who expect to be poor at both points 
in time. In line with the original POUM hypothesis, this finding only holds for those with 
lower levels of risk aversion (from a question on whether the individual would sell their car to 
buy insurance against a catastrophic drought).  
Guillaud (2013) uses 2006 ISSP data covering 33 countries to show that income and 
occupation are both important predictors of redistributive preferences. Equally, downward 
social mobility (having a lower position on the social scale now relative to ten years ago) 
increases the demand for redistribution, while upward social mobility reduces it. There is 
some evidence that the downward mobility coefficient is larger in size than that on upward 
mobility, as if individuals were loss-averse with respect to status. 
Clark and D’Angelo (2013) analyse 18 waves of BHPS data. They show that higher 
social status is associated with less favourable attitudes to redistribution and the public sector, 
as is commonly-found. However, they also find that upward mobility (relative to one’s 
parents) is associated with more Left-wing attitudes, which are shown to be translated into 
actual reported voting behaviour. 
As noted in Section 3.1 above, Alesina et al. (2004) show that the effect of inequality on 
happiness is larger in value in Europe than in the USA. The explanation proposed in Alesina 
et al. is in terms of greater perceived social mobility in the USA than in Europe.  
Measures of the demand for redistribution have also been shown to be correlated with 
the individual’s view of the fairness of the income distribution (Corneo and Gruner, 2002, and 
Luttens and Valfort, 2012). The former test the importance of fairness in determining 
preferences for redistribution via the answer to the ISSP question “How important is hard 
work for getting ahead in life?”, with responses “essential”, “very important”, “fairly 
important”, “not very important”, and “not important at all”. They show that there is a self-
interested component, in that those who state that they would personally benefit from lower 
inequality are indeed in favour of redistribution, while those with higher incomes are against 
distribution. The estimated coefficient on their fairness variable, ‘hard work is key’ (defined 
as providing one of the first three responses above), is shown to be negative and significant in 
a preferences for redistribution regression. 
Luttens and Valfort (2012) appeal to data from the WVS and the ESS. They show that 
both own income and the individual’s perception of fairness determine redistribution 
                                                 
27 Poor and rich (now and future) are derived from the individual’s response to a question about which decile of 
the income distribution they are at now and expect to be in four years’ time. The poor (rich) are those who give 
an answer which is under (over) the average answer for the population. 
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preferences. It is of interest to note that individuals in the US seem to more sensitive to 
fairness considerations in determining redistribution than are European respondents.  
Tóth and Keller (2011) consider data from the 2009 Poverty and Social Exclusion 
module of the Eurobarometer. They calculate a Redistributive Preferences Index (RPI) using 
Principal Component Analysis of five questions on redistribution. The values of this index are 
then correlated with both individual and country-level variables. The latter include estimates 
of the distribution of income matched in from LIS data. They show that the RPI is higher for 
those with lower material status, those who expect the situation to deteriorate over the next 12 
months, and who do not think that the poor are lazy. They also consider a number of 
percentile distribution measures (P95/P5, P95/P50 and P50/P5), as well as the Gini 
coefficient. All of the three percentile ratio measures attract positive significant estimated 
coefficients, so that the desire to redistribute rises with inequality. Inequality at the top and 
bottom of the distribution seems to play an equal role here. Yamamura (2012) also shows that 
the prefecture-level Gini coefficient is positively associated with redistributive preferences in 
seven years of Japanese GSS data, although with a significant effect only for the richer.  
One perhaps salient point here is that the questions used to establish preferences for 
redistribution are very different from one survey to another, which hampers the comparability 
of the existing results. Attitudes to income inequality are measured as follows in the BHPS: 
“People have different views about the way governments work. The government should place 
an upper limit on the amount of money that any one person can make”. Answers to this 
question are on a 1-5 scale, where 1 represents complete disagreement and 5 complete 
agreement. This is not a question about redistribution in general, but about pulling the top of 
the distribution down. In the ISSP, respondents are asked “On the whole, do you think it 
should or should not be the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences between 
the rich and the poor?”, with answers on a 1-4 scale. The relevant question in the WVS asks 
individuals to indicate, on a 1-10 scale, which of the two extremes they most agree with: 
“people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” versus “the government 
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”. As Luttens and 
Valfort (2012) note, this does mix up concerns for the income distribution with perceptions of 
government efficiency. Last, the question in the ESS is similar to that in the WVS, asking 
individuals to choose between “government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less 
on social benefits and services” and “government should increase taxes a lot and spend much 
more on social benefits and services”. 
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As well as individuals’ stated preferences for redistribution, a recent paper has provided 
intriguing evidence that the actual observed progressivity of the tax system is positively 
correlated with average national well-being. Oishi et al. (2012) use data from 54 countries in 
the 2007 Gallup World Poll. Respondents here report three different kinds of well-being 
measures: Cantril's ladder of the worst to best possible life, and positive and negative daily 
experiences. The country averages of these scores were correlated with the progressivity of 
the national tax system from Worldwide-Tax.com (calculated as the highest minus the lowest 
marginal tax rates, or the difference in the tax rates of those earning 67% and 167% of the 
country mean income). Tax progression is positively correlated with subjective well-being 
(see their Figure 1). This is not a simple revenue effect, as both the overall tax rate and 
government spending are significant in the well-being regressions. 
 
4.4    Only self-interest? 
The view of others in the comparative view of the reference group is arguably rather a 
depressing one. Other people are a negative externality in that Yi > Yj brings relative 
satisfaction and Yi < Yj relative deprivation for individual i. However certain others may be 
relevant for the individual, but not viewed in this comparative way. Rather, as intimated in the 
Introduction, there may well be a sentiment of extended sympathy towards some groups. In a 
parallel to the comparative reference group, the individuals towards whom behaves 
altruistically will be chosen by the individual, and may well exclude certain groups in society. 
This leads us to the discussion of altruistic behaviour, whereby transferring one's own 
money to others not only increases the recipient's well-being but also that of the donor. While 
it is commonplace that generous people record higher well-being scores, showing causality 
from the former to the latter is more difficult.28 Luckily there are a number of pieces of 
research which have suggested such a causal link.  
One way of establishing causality is to use experiments. There has been something of a 
cottage industry in using randomised allocations or natural experiments to look at the 
relationship between own income and subjective well-being. Dunn et al. (2008) build on the 
observed positive correlation between pro-social spending by considering a randomised 
experiment in which some individuals are forced to be generous. In particular, experimental 
participants first report their happiness. They are then given an envelope with either $5 or $20 
to spend that day. Half are told to spend the money on themselves, and the other half on 
                                                 
28 The experimental approach in Konow and Earley (2008) shows that those with (previously-elicited) happiness 
scores are subsequently more generous in Dictator Games. 
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someone else. Happiness recorded later that same evening shows a significant subjective well-
being margin in favour of those who spent on others. Importantly, when surveyed regarding 
what they thought would make them happy, a separate sample of respondents thought that 
spending on themselves would make them happier than spending on others: as such, 
individuals are not necessarily aware of the happiness benefits of altruism ex ante.  
Aknin et al. (2013) make the same point more broadly. They first report a positive 
correlation between prosocial spending and happiness in 136 countries from the Gallup World 
Poll. They also appeal to experimental analysis. In Canada and Uganda, individuals asked to 
recall a past instance of prosocial spending reported higher happiness scores than did those 
who were asked to recall a past instance of personal spending; equally, in India individuals 
asked to recall a past instance of prosocial spending reported higher happiness scores than did 
those who were not asked to recall past spending. Last, along the same lines as Dunn et al. 
(2008), participants in Canada and South Africa who were randomly assigned to buy items for 
charity reported greater positive affect than those who were assigned to purchase the same 
items for personal use. 
Boehm and Lyubomirsky (2009) show that individuals in a treatment group who were 
told to perform three extra acts of kindness a day experienced a sustained rise in happiness 
compared to a control group. 
It is a small step from monetary donations to others to volunteering in general, and 
Carpenter and Myers (2010) show that the two are indeed correlated. Meier and Stutzer  
(2008) analyse survey data around the time of German reunification, which led to a sharp 
reduction in volunteering opportunities in East Germany. Meier and Stutzer show that the 
drop in subjective well-being was larger for those who had previously volunteered than for 
those who had not: a natural conclusion is then that volunteering caused well-being. 
A vibrant research area of interest in this respect covers charitable giving. Individuals 
may give to charity either because they care about the recipients of their largesse, or because 
they derive some process utility from the act of giving that is independent of the use to which 
their gift is put (which is what Andreoni, 1989, calls ‘impure altruism’).29 Konow (2010) 
appeals to a series of carefully-designed experiments to show that giving to others cannot be 
only explained by the ‘warm glow’ of the process utility, and that the student subjects are 
systematically more generous toward charities than toward fellow students. This latter holds 
even when the charities are not known to the subjects, avoiding any role for familiarity. 
                                                 
29 Alternatively, charitable giving may be seen as a good that endows status on the benefactor, as in Frank 
(2004). 
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Konow suggests an over-arching role for context-dependent norms in the determination of 
giving to others, which he identifies as equity and need in his experiments. Useful relevant 
symposia on charitable donations can be found in the June 2011 special issue of the Journal 
of Public Economics on Charitable Giving and Fundraising, and the forthcoming OUP book 
edited by Fack and Landais. 
As noted by Clotfelter (2014), charitable giving is a more important phenomenon in the 
US than in other G7 countries. However, it does remain unclear whether such giving is always 
redistributional, in the sense of being aimed at the less well-off. A first point is that some 
charitable donations, especially among the richer, go to the Arts or Education. Perhaps even 
more saliently, charitable donations in the US are regressive in terms of the percentage of 
income donated (see http://philanthropy.com/article/Interactive-How-America-
Gives/133709/). 
Section 2.1 described a number of pieces of research in the vein of the comparative 
reference group, whereby higher incomes amongst relevant others were associated with lower 
levels of subjective well-being. This correlation is not always found to be negative however. 
A variety of contributions have found that satisfaction and the income of close neighbours are 
actually positively correlated. This is the case in survey data in Canada (Barrington-Leigh and 
Helliwell, 2008), China (Kingdon and Knight, 2007) and Denmark (Clark et al., 2009a). 
While the non-experimental protocol here makes interpretation more difficult (there are any 
number of reasons why people might be happier with richer neighbours, including tunnel 
effects or the provision of local public goods), these findings are consistent with empathy with 
respect to close neighbours. 
Kranton et al. (2013) also underline that individuals can be altruistic towards some 
individuals, but comparative with respect to others. Individuals in their experiment make a 
series of choices regarding income allocations between two subjects. These subjects can be 
the individual, a member of her own group, or a member of another group. These groups are 
determined either by political persuasion, or as ‘minimal groups’ depending on a preference 
over two nearly identical lines of poetry, landscape images, and abstract paintings. The 
authors find considerable heterogeneity in social preferences, and show that individuals are 
less generous (or even downright destructive, as in Zizzo and Oswald, 2001), towards 
individuals outsider their group, even when groups are essentially randomly-formed. 
The theoretical implications of altruism in terms of redistribution are analysed in 
Hochman and Rogers (1969). In this case, some redistribution can make everyone better off. 
Hochman and Rogers considers transfers only from richer to poorer, and which do not change 
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the income ranking. Transfers are costless: there is no leaky bucket. One of the central aims of 
their analysis is to establish how the amount transferred depends on the income gap between 
the rich and the poor. They distinguish two salient cases, which depend on the ‘transfer 
elasticity’. When this elasticity is zero, the same fixed sum is always transferred; when it 
equals one then the amount transferred is proportional to the income gap between the rich and 
the poor. A calibration suggests that actual US income tax rates are more consistent with the 




As so often in Economics, asking about the relationship between income inequality and 
individual attitudes looked to be a pretty simple question, but turned out to be remarkably 
more delicate to answer. 
The broad question addressed here is why individuals should care about the distribution 
of income in a society. The first useful distinction is whether they figure in the society in 
question or not. In the former case, income inequality will have implications for both their 
own income and their income relative to others: this is the comparative view of the income 
distribution. In the latter case, individuals can evaluate a distribution of income 
dispassionately, as it were, as this distribution will have no implications for either their own 
absolute income or their relative income: this is the normative view of the income 
distribution.  
As a broad conclusion, there is now a variety of types of evidence which are consistent 
with individuals caring about their income position relative to others. To that extent, 
individuals do indeed have social preferences. It is worth underlining the unanimity that 
individuals dislike earning less than others. The ‘comparative’ response to earning more than 
others remains open to debate. There may well be something of an asymmetry here, with the 
well-being advantage of earning more than others being smaller in absolute value than the 
well-being loss of earning less than others (a type of comparative loss aversion). However, the 
more extreme version of this aversion, with individuals actually disliking earning more than 
others remains open to debate. In general, the well-being effect of a rise in inequality under 
the comparative lens is ambiguous: some people will become richer than those in their 
reference group, others will become poorer. 
In contrast to these comparative findings, the happiness literature on the normative view 
of the income distribution has provided a wide scattershot of findings. One obvious difficulty 
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in any approach based on survey subjective well-being data is effectively controlling for 
relative income when estimating the correlation between happiness and the income 
distribution. Very few analyses do so, and therefore provide some kind of compound 
correlation which includes both comparative and normative elements. The experimental 
approach here has a notable advantage in being able to distinguish the two.  
Our reading of the many empirical analyses is that others’ income most certainly does 
affect individual well-being: certainly in a comparative sense and very likely normatively too. 
At the same time, there are many qualifications to any broad-brush conclusion. First, the 
source of the income under consideration is key, with a consistent finding that individuals are 
less accepting of income gaps between individuals that are seen to be undeserved. Second, 
individuals can have separate views of different income distributions: it is quite possible to be 
altruistic with respect to one group, but comparative with respect to another. In this sense, it is 
not clear that there is only one ‘attitude’ to inequality. Nor is it clear that such attitudes are 
fixed over time. For example, preferences for redistribution depend (in a self-interested way) 
on the individual’s perceived position in the income distribution, and on the degree of 
empathy towards others. Research in Psychology has suggested that younger cohorts are more 
likely to rate themselves as above average (Konrath et al., 2011), and are less empathic 
(Twenge et al., 2012). What may have been unacceptable in the past in terms of the 
distribution of income may become anodyne in the future. 
Research in this area has appealed to contributions from a variety of fields of research, 
both within Economics and across the Social Sciences. It is striking how little these various 
fields communicate with each other. Any attempt to integrate at least some of the revealed 
preference, experiment and happiness approaches would surely be welcome. 
Individuals do have attitudes towards income inequality, whether these be stated, 
revealed, or measured physiologically or neurologically. To this extent at least, man is a social 
animal. There is unlikely to be agreement any time soon about the ‘right’ degree of inequality. 
This will be tied up with the societal extent of jealousy, altruism, fairness and values. That 
many of these concepts are of such interest across the Social Sciences bodes well for Volume 




Abbink, K., Masclet, D., Van Veelen, M. (2009). “Reference Point Effects in Antisocial 
Preferences”. CBESS, Discussion Paper 09-03. 
Abel, A.B. (1990). “Asset prices under Habit Formation and Catching up with the Joneses”. 
American Economic Review 80, 38–42. 
Abel, A.B. (2005). “Optimal Taxation when Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels 
of Consumption”. Review of Economic Studies 72, 21–42. 
Abeler, J., Altmann, S., Kube, S., Wibral, M. (2010). “Gift Exchange and Workers' Fairness 
Concerns: When Equality is Unfair”. Journal of the European Economic Association 8, 
1299-1324. 
Akerlof, G.A., Kranton, R.E. (2000). “Economics and Identity”. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115, 715–753. 
Aknin, L., Barrington-Leigh, C., Dunn, E., Helliwell, J., Burns, J., Biswas-Diener, R., 
Kemeza, I., Nyende, P., Ashton-James, C., Norton, M. (2013). “Prosocial spending and 
well-being: Cross-cultural evidence for a psychological universal”. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 104, 635-652. 
Alesina, A., Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R. (2004). “Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans 
and Americans Different?”. Journal of Public Economics 88, 2009–2042. 
Alesina, A., Giuliano, P. (2010). “Preferences for Redistribution”. In J. Benhabib, M. Jackson, 
A. Bisin (Eds.), Handbook of Social Economics, Vol. 1A. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E. (2005). “Preferences for redistribution in the land of 
opportunities”. Journal of Public Economics 89, 897-931. 
Almås, I., Cappelen, A., Lind, J., Sørensen, E., Tungodden, B. (2011). “Measuring unfair 
(in)equality”. Journal of Public Economics 95, 488-499. 
Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F., Johansson-Stenman, O. (2005). “How much do we care about 
absolute versus relative income and consumption?” Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 56, 405–421. 
Amiel, Y., Cowell, F.A. (1992). “Measurement of income inequality. Experimental test by 
questionnaire” Journal of Public Economics 47, 3–26. 
Amiel, Y., Cowell, F.A. (1999). Thinking About Inequality. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 58
Amiel, Y., Cowell, F.A. (2002). “Attitudes towards Risk and Inequality: A Questionnaire-
Experimental Approach”. In Andersson, F., Holm, H.J. (Eds.) Experimental Economics: 
Financial Markets, Auctions, and Decision Making. Dewenter: Kluwer, 85–115. 
Amiel, Y., Cowell, F.A., Gaertner, W. (2012). “Distributional Orderings: an Approach with 
Seven Flavors”. Theory and Decision 73, 381–399. 
Amiel, Y., Creedy, J., Hurn, S. (1999). “Measuring Attitudes Towards Inequality”. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101, 83–96. 
Andreoni, J. (1989). “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian 
Equivalence”. Journal of Political Economy 97, 1447-1458. 
Aronsson, T., Johansson-Stenman, O. (2008). “When the Joneses' consumption hurts: Optimal 
public good provision and nonlinear income taxation”. Journal of Public Economics 92, 
986-997. 
Atkinson, A.B. (1970). “On the Measurement of Inequality”. Journal of Economic Theory 2, 
244–63. 
Ball, R. (2001). “Incomes, Inequality and Happiness: New Evidence”. Haverford College, 
mimeo. 
Barrington-Leigh, C., Helliwell, J. (2008). “Empathy and emulation: Life satisfaction and the 
urban geography of comparison groups”. NBER Working Paper 14593. 
Becker, G.S. (1974). “A Theory of Social Interactions”. Journal of Political Economy 82, 
1063–1093. 
Beckman, S.R., Formby, J.P. Smith, W.J. (2004). “Efficiency, Equity and Democracy: 
Experimental Evidence on Okun’s Leaky Bucket”. Research on Economic Inequality 11, 
17–42. 
Bell, L., Freeman, R. (2001). “The Incentive to Work Hard: Explaining Work Hour 
Differences in the US and Germany”. Labour Economics 8, 181–202. 
Bellemare, C., Kröger, S., van Soest, A. (2008). “Measuring Inequity Aversion in a 
Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities”. 
Econometrica 76, 815–839. 
Benabou R., Ok E. (2001). “Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: the POUM 
Hypothesis”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 447-487. 
Berg, M., Veenhoven, R. (2010). “Income inequality and happiness in 119 nations”. In B. 
Greve (Ed.), Social Policy and Happiness in Europe. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar  
Bergh, A. (2008). “A Critical Note on the Theory of Inequity Aversion”. Journal of Socio-
Economics 37, 1789–1796.  
 59
Biancotti, C., D’Alessio, G. (2008). “Values, Inequality and Happiness”. Banca d’Italia, 
Economic Working Paper No. 669. 
Binmore, K., Shaked, A. (2010a). “Experimental Economics: Where Next?”. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 73, 87–100. 
Binmore, K., Shaked, A. (2010b). “Experimental Economics: Where Next? Rejoinder”. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 73, 120–121. 
Bjørnskov, C., Dreher, A., Fischer, J. (2008). “Cross-country Determinants of Life 
Satisfaction: Exploring Different Determinants across Groups in Society”. Social Choice 
and Welfare 30, 119–173. 
Bjørnskov, C., Dreher, A., Fischer, J., Schnellenbach, J., Gehring, K. (2013). “Inequality and 
Happiness: When Perceived Social Mobility and Economic Reality Do Not Match”. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 91, 75-92. 
Blanchflower, D.G., Freeman, R.B. (1997). “The Attitudinal Legacy of Communist Labor 
Relations”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 50, 438-459. 
Blanchflower, D.G., Oswald, A.J. (2003). “Does Inequality Reduce Happiness? Evidence 
from the States of the USA from the 1970s to the 1990s”. Dartmouth College, mimeo. 
Bloch, F., Rao, V., Desai, S. (2004). “Wedding Celebrations as Conspicuous Consumption: 
Signaling Social Status in Rural India”. Journal of Human Resources 39, 675-695. 
Boehm, J.K., Lyubomirsky, S. (2009). “The promise of sustainable happiness”. In S. Lopez 
(Ed.), Handbook of Positive Psychology (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bolton, G.E. (1991). “A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence”. American 
Economic Review 81, 1096–1136. 
Bolton, G.E., Ockenfels, A. (2000). “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and 
Competition”. American Economic Review 90, 166–193. 
Boskin, M.J., Sheshinki, E. (1978). “Optimal Redistributive Taxation when Individual 
Welfare Depends upon Relative Income”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 92, 589–601. 
Bossert W., D'Ambrosio, C. (2007). “Dynamic Measures of Individual Deprivation”. Social 
Choice and Welfare 28, 77–88. 
Bossert W., D'Ambrosio, C., Peragine, V. (2007). “Deprivation and Social Exclusion”. 
Economica 74, 777–803. 
Bowles, S., Park, Y. (2005). “Emulation, Inequality, and Work Hours: Was Thorstein Veblen 
Right?”. Economic Journal 115, 397–412. 
Boyce, C., Brown, G., Moore, S. (2010). “Money and Happiness: Rank of Income, not 
Income, Affects Life Satisfaction”. Psychological Science 21, 471-475. 
 60
Brodeur, A., Flèche, S. (2013). “Where the Streets Have a Name: Income Comparisons in the 
US”. IZA, Discussion Paper No. 7256. 
Brooks, R., Scott, I., Maklakov, A., Kasumovic, M., Clark, A., Penton-Voak, I. (2011). 
“National Income Inequality Predicts Women's Preferences for Masculinized Faces Better 
than Health Does”. Proceedings of the Royal Society B - Biological Sciences 278, 810–
812. 
Brosnan, S., de Waal, F. (2003). “Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay”. Nature 425, 297–299. 
Brown, G., Gardner, J., Oswald, A.J., Qian, J. (2008). “Does Wage Rank Affect Employees' 
Wellbeing?” Industrial Relations 47, 355 - 389. 
Brown, P., Bulte, E., Zhang, X. (2011). “Positional Spending and Status Seeking in Rural 
China”. Journal of Development Economics 96, 139–149. 
Burgoon, B. (2013). “Inequality and Anti-globalization Backlash by Political Parties”. 
European Union Politics 14, 408-435. 
Camerer, C.F. (2003). Behavioural Game Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Camerer, C.F., Fehr, E. (2004). “Measuring Social Norms and Preferences using 
Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists”. In: J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, 
C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, R. McElreath (Eds.), Foundations of Human Sociality. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Camerer, C.F., Fehr, E. (2006). “When does “economic man” dominate social behavior?” 
Science 311, 47–52. 
Campbell, J.Y., Cochrane, J.H. (1999). “By Force of Habit: a Consumption-Based 
Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior”. Journal of Political Economy 107, 
205–251.  
Card, D., Mas, A., Moretti, E., Saez, E. (2012). “Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer 
Salaries on Job Satisfaction”. American Economic Review 102, 2981–3003. 
Carlsson, F., Daruvala, D., Johansson-Stenman, O. (2005). “Are People Inequality-Averse, or 
Just Risk-Averse?”. Economica 72, 375–396. 
Carlsson, F., Johansson-Stenman, O., Martinsson, P. (2007). “Do You Enjoy Having More 
than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods”. Economica 74, 586–598. 
Carpenter, J.P., Myers, C.K. (2010). “Why volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, 
reputation, and incentives”. Journal of Public Economics 94, 911–920. 
Cappelli, P., Sherer, P.D. (1988). “Satisfaction, Market Wages and Labor Relations: An 
Airline Study”. Industrial Relations 27, 56–73. 
 61
Chakravarty, S.R. (1997) “Relative Deprivation and Satisfaction Orderings”. Keio Economic 
Studies 34, 17–31. 
Chakravarty, S.R. (2009). Inequality, Polarization and Poverty. Advances in Distributional 
Analysis. Springer, New York. 
Charness, G., Rabin, M. (2002). “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests”. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 817–869. 
Cherry, T.L., Frykblom, P., Shogren, J.F. (2002). “Hardnose the Dictator”. American 
Economic Review 92, 1218–1221. 
Clark, A.E. (2003). “Inequality-Aversion and Income Mobility: A Direct Test”. DELTA, 
Discussion Paper 2003-11. 
Clark, A.E., D'Angelo, E. (2013). “Social Mobility, Wellbeing and Redistribution”. PSE, 
mimeo. 
Clark, A.E., Flèche, S., Senik, C. (2014). “The Great Happiness Moderation”. In A.E. Clark 
and C. Senik (Eds.), Happiness and Economic Growth: Lessons from Developing 
Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Clark, A.E., Frijters, P., Shields, M. (2008). “Relative Income, Happiness and Utility: An 
Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles”. Journal of Economic Literature 
46, 95–144. 
Clark, A.E., Kristensen, N., Westergård-Nielsen, N. (2009a). “Economic Satisfaction and 
Income Rank in Small Neighbourhoods”. Journal of the European Economic Association 
7, 519-527. 
Clark, A.E., Kristensen, N., Westergård-Nielsen, N. (2009b). “Job Satisfaction and Co-worker 
Wages: Status or Signal?” Economic Journal 119, 430–447. 
Clark, A.E., Masclet, D., Villeval, M.-C. (2010). “Effort and Comparison Income”. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 63, 407–426. 
Clark, A.E., Oswald, A.J. (1996). “Satisfaction and Comparison Income”. Journal of Public 
Economics 61, 359–381. 
Clark, A.E., Senik, C. (2010). “Who Compares to Whom? The Anatomy of Income 
Comparisons in Europe”. Economic Journal 120, 573–594. 
Clark, A.E., Senik, C. (2011). “Will GDP Growth Increase Happiness in Developing 
Countries?” In Peccoud, R. (Ed.), Measure For Measure: How Well Do We Measure 
Development?. STIN, Paris. 
 62
Clark, A.E., Senik, C. (2014). “Income Comparisons in Chinese Villages”. In A.E. Clark and 
C. Senik (Eds.), Happiness and Economic Growth: Lessons from Developing Countries. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Clotfelter, C. (2014). “Charitable Giving and Tax Policy in the U.S.” In G. Fack and C. 
Landais (Eds.), Charitable Giving and Tax Policy: A Historical and Comparative 
Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cohn, A., Fehr, E., Goette, L. (2014), “Fair Wages and Effort: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment”, Management Science, forthcoming. 
Cojocaru, A. (2014a). “Fairness and inequality tolerance: evidence from the Life in Transition 
survey”. Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming. 
Cojocaru, A. (2014b). “Prospects of upward mobility and preferences for redistribution: 
evidence from the Life in Transition Survey”. European Journal of Political Economy, 
forthcoming. 
Collard, D. (1975). “Edgeworth's Propositions on Altruism”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
85, 355–360. 
Corazzini, L., Esposito, L., Majorano, F. (2012). “Reign in Hell or Serve in Heaven? A Cross-
country Journey into the Relative vs. Absolute Perceptions of Wellbeing”. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 81, 715–730. 
Corneo, G., Grüner, H.-P. (2002). “Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution”. 
Journal of Public Economics 83, 83-107. 
Cowell, F., Cruces, G.A. (2004). “Perceptions of Inequality and Risk”. Research on Economic 
Inequality 12, 97–133. 
D'Ambrosio, C., Frick, J.R. (2007). “Income Satisfaction and Relative Deprivation: an 
Empirical Link”. Social Indicators Research 81, 497–519. 
D'Ambrosio, C., Frick, J.R. (2012). “Individual Well-Being in a Dynamic Perspective”. 
Economica 79, 284–302. 
Daly, M., Wilson, M., Vasdev, S. (2001). “Income Inequality and Homicide Rates in Canada 
and the United States”. Canadian Journal of Criminology 43, 219–236. 
Dawes, C., Fowler, J.H., Johnson, T., McElreath, R., Smirnov, O. (2007). “Egalitarian 
Motives in Humans”. Nature 446, 794–796. 
Dawes, C., Loewen, P., Schreiber, D., Simmons, A., Flagand, T., McElreath, R., Bokemper, 
S., Fowler, J., Paulus, M. (2012). “Neural Basis of Egalitarian Behaviour”. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Science 109, 6479–6483. 
 63
DeBruine, L., Jones, B., Crawford, J., Welling, L., Little, A. (2011). “The Health of a Nation 
Predicts their Mate Preferences: Cross-cultural Variation in Women’s Preferences for 
Masculinized Male Faces”. Proceedings of the Royal Society B - Biological Sciences 277, 
2405–2410. 
de Vries, R., Gosling, S., Potter, J. (2011). “Income Inequality and Personality: Are Less 
Equal U.S. States Less Agreeable?” Social Science & Medicine 72, 1978–1985. 
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R. (2008). “Gross National Happiness as an Answer to the 
Easterlin Paradox?” Journal of Development Economics 86, 22–42. 
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R.J., Oswald, A.J. (2001). “Preferences over Inflation and 
Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness”. American Economic Review 91, 
335–341. 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Fliessbach, K., Sunde, U., Weber, B. (2011). “Relative Versus 
Absolute Income, Joy of Winning, and Gender: Brain Imaging Evidence”. Journal of 
Public Economics 95, 279–285. 
Duesenberry, J.S. (1949). Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Dunn, E., Aknin, L., Norton, M. (2008). “Spending Money on Others Promotes Happiness”. 
Science 319, 1687-1688. 
Dupor, B., Liu, W.-F. (2003). “Jealousy and Equilibrium Overconsumption”. American 
Economic Review 93, 423–428. 
Easterlin, R.A. (1974). “Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?” In David, P.A., 
Melvin, W.B. (Eds.), Nations and Households in Economic Growth. Stanford University 
Press, Palo Alto. 
Easterlin, R., Angelescu-McVey, L., Switek, M., Sawangfa, O., Zweig, J. (2010). “The 
happiness–income paradox revisited”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
107, 22463-22468. 
Ebert, U. (1988). “Measurement of Inequality: An Attempt at Unification and 
Generalization”. Social Choice and Welfare 5, 147–69. 
Ebert, U., Welsch, H. (2009). “How do Europeans Evaluate Income Distributions? An 
Assessment Based on Happiness Surveys”. Review of Income and Wealth 55, 801–819. 
Eckel, C., Gintis, H. (2010). “Blaming the Messenger: Notes on the Current State of 
Experimental Economics”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 73, 109–119. 
Ehrenberg, R., Bognanno, M. (1990). “Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?”. Journal of 
Political Economy 98, 1307–1324. 
 64
Engel, C. (2011). “Dictator Games: a Meta Study”. Experimental Economics 14, 583–610. 
Engelmann, D., Strobel, M. (2000). “An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models by 
Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt”. Econometric Society World Congress 
2000 Contributed Papers 1229. 
Engelmann, D., Strobel, M. (2004). “Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin 
Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments”. American Economic Review 94, 857–
869. 
Engelmann, D., Strobel, M. (2007). “Preferences over Income Distributions. Experimental 
Evidence”. Public Finance Review 35, 285–310. 
Esteban, J.-M., Ray, D. (1994). “On the Measurement of Polarization”. Econometrica 62, 
819–51. 
Fack, G., Landais, C. (2014) (Eds.), Charitable Giving and Tax Policy: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Falk, A., Kosse, F., Menrath, I., Verde, P., Siegrist, J. (2013). “Unfair Pay and Health”, 
University of Bonn, mimeo. 
Farina, F., Grimalda, G. (2011). “A cross-country experimental comparison of preferences for 
redistribution”, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) 
University of Siena Working Paper No. 2/2011. 
Fehr, E., Gächter, S. (2000). “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments”. 
American Economic Review 90, 980–994. 
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M. (1999). “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Co-operation”. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817–868. 
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M. (2003). “Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and 
Economic Applications”. In Dewatripont, M., Hansen, L.P, Turnovsky, S.J. (Eds.), 
Advances in Economic Theory, Eight World Congress of the Econometric Society, vol. I. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 208–257. 
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M. (2010). “On Inequity Aversion. A Reply to Binmore and Shaked”. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 73, 101–108. 
Ferrer–i–Carbonell, A. (2005). “Income and Well–being: an Empirical Analysis of the 
Comparison Income Effect”. Journal of Public Economics 89, 997–1019. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A., Ramos, X. (2014). “Inequality Aversion and Risk Attitudes”. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, forthcoming. 
Fershtman, C., Weiss, Y. (1993). “Social Status, Culture and Economic Performance”. 
Economic Journal 103, 946–959. 
 65
Fleurbaey, M. (1995). “Equality and responsibility”. European Economic Review 39, 683-
689. 
Fließbach, K., Phillipps, C., Trautner, P., Schnabel, M., Elger, C., Falk, A., Weber, B. (2012). 
“Neural Responses to Advantageous and Disadvantageous Inequity". Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience 6, Article 165. 
Fließbach, K., Weber, B., Trautner, P., Dohmen, T., Sunde, U., Elger, C., Falk, A. (2007). 
“Social Comparison Affects Reward–related Brain Activity in the Human Ventral 
Striatum”. Science 318, 1305–1308. 
Förster, M., Tóth, I. (2014). “Cross-Country Evidence of the Multiple Causes of Inequality in 
the OECD Area”. In A. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (Eds.), Handbook of Income 
Distribution Volume 2A. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Frank, R.H. (1985). Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behaviour and the Quest for Status. 
London and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Frank, R.H. (1999). Luxury Fever. New York: The Free Press. 
Frank, R.H. (2004). What Price the Moral High Ground? Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Frijters, P., Leigh, A. (2008). “Materialism on the march: from conspicuous leisure to 
conspicuous consumption?” Journal of Socio-Economics 37, 1937–1945. 
Gaertner, W., Namazie, C. (2003). “Income Inequality, Risk, and the Transfer Principle: A 
Questionnaire-Experimental Investigation”. Mathematical Social Sciences 45, 229–245. 
Galí, J. (1994). “Keeping Up with the Joneses: Consumption Externalities, Portfolio Choice, 
and Asset Prices”. Journal of Money Credit and Banking 26, 1–8. 
Graham, C., Felton, A. (2006). “Inequality and Happiness: Insights from Latin America”. 
Journal of Economic Inequality 4, 107–122. 
Grosfeld, I., Senik, C. (2010). “The Emerging Aversion to Inequality. Evidence from Poland 
1992-2005”. Economics of Transition 18, 1–26. 
Guillaud, E. (2013). “Preferences for Redistribution: an Empirical Analysis Over 33 
Countries”. Journal of Economic Inequality 11, 57–78. 
Güth, W., Kliemt, H., Levati, M.V., (2009), “(Over-)Stylizing Experimental Findings and 
Theorizing with Sweeping Generality”. Rationality, Markets and Morals 0, 239–249. 
Hagenaars, A.J. (1986). The Perception of Poverty. Amsterdam: North–Holland. 
Hagerty, M.R. (2000). “Social Comparisons of Income in One's Community: Evidence from 
National Surveys of Income and Happiness”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
78, 764–771. 
 66
Heffetz, O. (2011). “A Test of Conspicuous Consumption: Visibility and Income Elasticities”. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 93, 1101–1117. 
Helliwell, J.F. (2003). “How's Life? Combining Individual and National Variables to Explain 
Subjective Well-Being”. Economic Modelling 20, 331–360. 
Hey, J.D., Lambert, P.J. (1980). “Relative Deprivation and the Gini Coefficient: Comment”. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 95, 567–573. 
Herreiner, D.K., Puppe, C. (2010). “Inequality Aversion and Efficiency with Ordinal and 
Cardinal Social Preferences—An Experimental Study”. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 76, 238–253. 
Hirschman, A. (1973). “The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of 
Economic Development”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, 544–566. 
Hochman, H.M., Rogers, J.D. (1969). “Pareto Optimal Redistribution”. American Economic 
Review 59, 542-557. 
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., Smith, V. (1994). “Preferences, Property Rights, and 
Anonymity in Bargaining Games”. Games and Economic Behavior 7, 346–380. 
Hyman, H.H. (1942). “The Psychology of Status”. Archives of Psychology 269, 5–91.  
Jancewicz, B. (2012). "Measurement of income inequality re-examined Constructing 
experimental tests by questionnaire". University of Warsaw, mimeo. 
Jasso, G. (2007). “Studying Justice: Measurement, Estimation, and Analysis of the Actual 
Reward and the Just Reward”. In Törnblom, K., Vermunt, R. (Eds.), Distributive and 
Procedural Justice: Research and Social Applications. London: Ashgate. 
Jiang, S., Lu, M., Sato, H. (2012). “Identity, Inequality, and Happiness: Evidence from Urban 
China”. World Development 40, 1190–1200.  
Johansson-Stenman, O., Carlsson, F., Daruvala, D. (2002). “Measuring Future Grandparents’ 
Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing”. Economic Journal 112, 362–38. 
Kelley, H.H. (1965). “Two Functions of Reference Groups”, in Proshansky, H., Siedemberg 
B. (Eds.), Basic Studies in Social Psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
210–214. 
Kingdon, G., Knight, J. (2007). “Community, Comparisons and Subjective Well-being in a 
Divided Society”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 64, 69-90. 
Knight, J., Song, L., Gunatilaka, R. (2009). “Subjective Well-being and its Determinants in 
Rural China”. China Economic Review 20, 635–649. 
Konow, J. (2010). “Mixed feelings: Theories of and evidence on giving”. Journal of Public 
Economics 94, 279-297. 
 67
Konow, J., Earley, J. (2008). “The Hedonistic Paradox: Is Homo Economicus Happier?” 
Journal of Public Economics 92, 1-33. 
Konrath, S., O’Brien, E., Hsing, C. (2011). “Changes in Dispositional Empathy in American 
College Students Over Time: A Meta-Analysis”. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review 15, 180 –198. 
Kranton, R., Pease, M., Sanders, S., Huettel, S. (2013). “Identity, Groups, and Social 
Preferences”. Duke University, mimeo. 
Krawczyk, M. (2010). “A Glimpse Through the Veil of Ignorance: Equality of Opportunity 
and Support for Redistribution”. Journal of Public Economics 94, 131–141. 
Kroll, Y., Davidovitz, L. (2003). “Inequality Aversion versus Risk Aversion”. Economica 70, 
19–29. 
Kuhn, P., Kooreman, P., Soetevent, A., Kapteyn, A. (2011). “The Effects of Lottery Prizes on 
Winners and their Neighbors: Evidence from the Dutch Postcode Lottery”. American 
Economic Review 101, 2226–2247. 
Kuziemko, I., Buell, R., Reich, T., Norton, M. (2014). ““Last-Place Aversion”: Evidence and 
Redistributive Implications”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, 105-149. 
Layard, R. (2005). Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. London: Penguin. 
Leibenstein, H. (1950). “Bandwagon, Snob and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' 
Demand”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 64, 183–207. 
Levitt, S., List, J. (2007). “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences 
Reveal About the Real World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 153-174. 
Ljungqvist, L., Uhlig, H. (2000). “Tax Policy and Aggregate Demand Management Under 
Catching Up with the Joneses”. American Economic Review 90, 356–366. 
Loewenstein, G., Thompson, L., Bazerman, M. (1989). “Social Utility and Decision Making 
in Interpersonal Contexts”. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, 426–441  
Loughnan, S., Kuppens, P., Allik, J., Balazs, K., de Lemus, S., Dumont, K., Gargurevich, R., 
Hidegkuti, I., Leidner, B., Matos, L., Park, J., Realo, A., Shi, J., Eduardo Sojo, V., Tong, 
Y., Vaes, J., Verduyn, P., Yeung, V., Haslam, N. (2011). “Economic Inequality Is Linked 
to Biased Self-Perception”. Psychological Science 22, 1254-1258. 
Luechinger, S. (2009). “Valuing Air Quality Using the Life Satisfaction Approach”. 
Economic Journal 119, 482–515. 
Luttens, R., Valfort, M.-A. (2012). “Voting for Redistribution under Desert-Sensitive 
Altruism”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 114, 881–907. 
 68
Luttmer, E. (2005). “Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well–Being”. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 120, 963–1002. 
Macours, K. (2011). “Increasing inequality and civil conflict in Nepal”. Oxford Economic 
Papers 63, 1-26. 
Macunovich, D. (2011). “A Note on Inequality Aversion Across Countries, Using Two New 
Measures”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 5734. 
Manski, C. (2000). “Economic Analysis of Social Interactions”. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 14, 115–136. 
Mas, A. (2006). “Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance”. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 121, 783–821. 
Masclet, D., Villeval, M.-C. (2008). “Punishment, Inequality, and Welfare: a Public Good 
Experiment”. Social Choice and Welfare 31, 475–502. 
Meier, S., Stutzer, A. (2008). “Is Volunteering Rewarding in Itself?” Economica 75, 39-59. 
Merton, R.K., Kitt, A.S. (1950). “Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group 
Behaviour”. In Merton, R.K., Lazersfeld, P.F. (Eds.), Continuities in Social Research. 
Studies in the Scope and Method of “The American Soldier”. New York: Free Press. 
Morawetz, D., Atia, E., Bin-Nun, G., Felous, L., Gariplerden, Y., Harris, E., Soustiel, S., 
Tombros, G., Zarfaty, Y. (1977). “Income Distribution and Self-Rated Happiness: Some 
Empirical Evidence”. Economic Journal, 87, 511–522. 
Moulton, B. (1990). “An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate 
Variables on Micro Units”. Review of Economics and Statistics 72, 334-38. 
Mujcic, R., Frijters, P. (2013). “Economic choices and status: measuring preferences for 
income rank”. Oxford Economic Papers 65, 47-73. 
Ng, Y.-K. (1987). “Relative-Income Effects and the Appropriate Level of Public 
Expenditure”. Oxford Economic Papers 39, 293–300. 
O'Connell, M. (2004). “Fairly satisfied: Economic Equality, Wealth and Satisfaction”. Journal 
of Economic Psychology 25, 297-305. 
Oishi, S., Kesebir, S., Diener, E. (2011). “Income Inequality and Happiness”. Psychological 
Science 22, 1095–1100. 
Oishi, S., Schimmack, U., Diener, E. (2012). “Progressive Taxation and the Subjective Well-
Being of Nations”. Psychological Science 23, 86–92. 
Osberg, L., Smeeding, T. (2006). ““Fair inequality”? Attitudes toward pay differentials: the 
United States in comparative perspective”. American Sociological Review 71, 450–473. 
 69
Oshio, T., Kobayashi, M. (2010). “Income Inequality, Perceived Happiness, and Self-rated 
Health: Evidence from Nationwide Surveys in Japan”. Social Science & Medicine 70, 
1358–1366. 
Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (1994). “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?” American Economic 
Review 84, 600-621. 
Piketty, T. (1995). “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics”. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 110, 551-584. 
Pirttilä, J., Uusitalo, R. (2008). “A 'Leaky Bucket' in the Real World: Estimating Inequality 
Aversion using Survey Data”. Economica 77, 60–76. 
Ravallion M., Lokshin M. (2000). “Who Wants to Redistribute? The Tunnel Effect in 1990’s 
Russia”. Journal of Public Economics 76, 87-104. 
Roemer, J., and Trannoy, A. (2014). "Equality of Opportunity". Forthcoming in A. Atkinson 
and F. Bourguignon (Eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution Volume 2A. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Rothstein, B., Uslaner, E. (2005). “All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust”. World 
Politics 58, 41–72. 
Rozer, J., Kraaykamp, G. (2013). “Income Inequality and Subjective Well-being: A Cross-
National Study on the Conditional Effects of Individual and National Characteristics”. 
Social Indicators Research 113, 1009–1023. 
Runciman, W.G. (1966). Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. London: Routledge. 
Schneider, S.M. (2012). “Income Inequality and its Consequences for Life Satisfaction: What 
Role do Social Cognitions Play?”. Social Indicators Research 106, 419–438. 
Schor, J. (1992). The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Schwarze, J., Härpfer, M. (2007). “Are People Inequality-Averse, and Do They Prefer 
Redistribution by the State? Evidence from German Longitudinal Data on Life 
Satisfaction”. Journal of Socio-Economics 36, 233–249. 
Senik, C. (2004). “When Information Dominates Comparison. Learning from Russian 
Subjective Panel Data”. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2099–2123. 
Senik, C. (2009). “Direct evidence on income comparisons and their welfare effects”. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization 72, 408-424. 
Shall, L.D. (1972). “Interdependent Utilities and Pareto Optimality”. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 86, 19–24. 
 70
Shibutani, T. (1955). “Reference Groups as Perspectives”. American Journal of Sociology 60, 
562–569. 
Sloane, S., Baillargeon, R., Premack, D. (2012). “Do Infants Have a Sense of Fairness?”. 
Psychological Science 23, 158–160. 
Smyth, R., Qian, X. (2008). “Inequality and Happiness in Urban China”. Economics Bulletin 
4, 1–10. 
Sobel, J. (2005). “Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity”. Journal of Economic 
Literature 43, 392–436. 
Solnick, S., Hemenway, D. (1998). “Is More Always Better?: A Survey on Positional. 
Concerns”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 37, 373–83. 
Solnick, S., Hemenway, D. (2005). “Are Positional Concerns Stronger in Some Domains than 
in Others?”. American Economic Review 95, 147–151. 
Steijn, S., Lancee, B. (2011). “Does Income Inequality Negatively Affect General Trust? 
Examining Three Potential Problems with the Inequality-trust Hypothesis". University of 
Amsterdam, GINI Discussion Paper No. 20. 
Stevenson, B., Wolfers, J. (2008). "Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: 
Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox". Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 1-
102. 
Stichnoth, H., Van der Straeten, K. (2013). “Ethnic Diversity, Public Spending, and 
Individual Support for the Welfare State: A Review of the Empirical Literature”. Journal of 
Economic Surveys 27, 364–389. 
Stigler, G.J., Becker, G.S. (1974). “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum”. American Economic 
Review 67, 76–90. 
Takahashi, H., Kato, M., Matsuura, M., Mobbs, D., Suhara, T., Okubo, Y. (2009). “When 
Your Gain is My Pain and Your Pain is My Gain: Neural Correlates of Envy and 
Schadenfreude”. Science, 323, 937–939. 
Teyssier, S. (2012). “Inequity and Risk Aversion in Sequential Public Good Games”. Public 
Choice 151, 91–119. 
Thaler, R.H. (1988). “Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
2, 195–206. 
Tomes, N. (1986). “Income Distribution, Happiness and Satisfaction: A Direct Test of the 
Interdependent Preferences Model”. Journal of Economic Psychology 7, 425–446. 
Tóth, I., Keller, T. (2011). “Income Distributions, Inequality Perceptions and Redistributive 
Claims in European Societies”. GINI Discussion Paper No. 7. 
 71
Tricomi, E., Rangel, A., Camerer, C., O'Doherty, J. (2010). “Neural evidence for inequality-
averse social preferences”. Nature 463, 1089-1091. 
Twenge, J., Campbell, W.K., Gentile, B. (2012). “Generational increases in agentic self-
evaluations among American college students, 1966–2009”. Self and Identity 11, 409-427. 
Tyran, J.-R., Sausgruber, R. (2006). “A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in 
democracy”. European Economic Review 50, 469–485. 
Vandendriessche, D. (2012). “Inequality Aversion: Mediation of Needs and Social 
Comparisons”. Masters Thesis, Université de Paris 1. 
Van de Stadt, H., Kapteyn, A., Van de Geer, S. (1985). “The Relativity of Utility: Evidence 
from Panel Data”. Review of Economics and Statistics 67, 179–187. 
Van de Werfhorst, H.G., Salverda, W. (2012). “Consequences of Economic Inequality: 
Introduction to a Special Issue”. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 30, 377–
387. 
Van Praag, B.M.S. (1977). “The Perception of Welfare Inequality”. European Economic 
Review 10, 189-207. 
Van Praag, B.M.S., Baarsma, B.E. (2005). “Using Happiness Surveys to Value Intangibles: 
the Case of Airport Noise”. Economic Journal 115, 224–246. 
Van Veelen, M. (2012). “Review of “A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its 
Evolution” by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis”. Journal of Economic Literature 50, 
797-803. 
Veblen, T. (1949). "The Theory of the Leisure Class". London [Originally published 1899 by 
Macmillan New York]: George Allen and Unwin. 
Verme, P. (2011). “Life Satisfaction and Income Inequality”. Review of Income and Wealth 
57, 111–137. 
Winkelmann, R., Winkelmann, L. (2010). “Does Inequality Harm the Middle-Class? 
Evidence from Switzerland”. Kyklos 63, 301–316. 
Wu, Y., Zhang, D., Elieson, B., Zhou, X. (2012). “Brain Potentials in Outcome Evaluation: 
When Social Comparison Takes Effect”. International Journal of Psychophysiology 85, 
145–152. 
Yamada, K., and Sato, M. (2013). “Another avenue for anatomy of income comparisons: 
Evidence from hypothetical choice experiments”. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 89, 35-57. 
 Yamamura, E. (2012) “Social capital, household income, and preferences for income 
redistribution”. European Journal of Political Economy 28, 498-511. 
 72
Yitzhaki, S. (1979). “Relative Deprivation and the Gini Coefficient”. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 93, 321–324. 
Zaki, J., Mitchell, J. (2011). “Equitable decision making is associated with neural markers of 
intrinsic value”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 108, 19761-19766. 
Zizzo, D.J., Oswald, A.J. (2001). “Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others' Incomes?” 
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique 63–64, 39–65. 
 73
Table 1. Income Inequality and Individual Subjective Well-being. 




Measure Inequality and SWB? 





community level Happiness Negative 
Tomes (1986) Canada 1977 Quality of Life Survey 
Census data on 
share of income 
received by the 





and Happiness  Positive correlation for men 






Hagerty (2000) Cross-Country 8 countries Gini  Happiness Negative 
Ball (2001) Cross-Country 
1996 World Values 
Survey Gini by country 
Life 
satisfaction 
Positive in raw data, Positive and 




USA 20 years of GSS D5/D1 by State and year 
Life 
satisfaction  
Negative (but only significant for 
women, young, and the less 
educated). 
Clark (2003) UK BHPS Waves 1-11 Gini by region and year 
Life 
satisfaction 
Positive, especially for those who 
are more income mobile 
Helliwell (2003) Cross-Country WVS Waves 1-3 
Gini by country 
and year 
Life 
satisfaction No relation 
Senik (2004) Russia 5 years of RLMS Gini by region and year 
Life 
satisfaction  No relation 
Alesina et al. 
(2004) USA GSS (1972-97) Gini by year 
Life 
satisfaction No relation 














Gini by country 
and year Happiness No relation 
Schwarze and 
Härpfer (2007) Germany SOEP 












range by country Happiness 
Negative for those with more 
inclusive and moderate values 
Bjornskov et al. 
(2008) 
Cross-
Country WVS Wave 3 Gini by country 
Life 
satisfaction No relation 











No relation, but depends on other 











country and year 
Life 
satisfaction Negative 
Knight et al. 
(2009) China 
2002 national 






World Database of 
Happiness (2000-
2006) 
Gini by country 
and year Happiness Slightly positive 
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Grosfeld and 








Positive and then Negative as 
transition takes place (break in 
























Oishi et al. 
(2011) USA GSS (1972-2008) Gini by year Happiness 
Negative. Effect significant only 
for those in the bottom two 
quintiles of the income 
distribution. Effect is moderated 
by the perceived fairness of 
others, and whether the individual 
believes that others can be trusted 
Verme (2011) Cross-Country WVS Waves 1-4 








Country ESS Round 4 Gini by country Happiness Negative 
Bjornskov et al. 
(2013) 
Cross-
Country WVS Waves 2-5 




Effect more Positive the more the 
individual perceives society to be 
fair 
Brodeur and 








Negative for all three of 
percentage of people of all ages in 
poverty, the percentage of related 
children age 5 to 17 in families in 
poverty and the percentage of 
people under age 18 in poverty in 
the county. Conditional on own 






Country WVS Waves 1-5 










Country LiTS Wave 1 








 Figure 1. Two log-normal income distributions, with the same variance. 
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